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RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON STANDING IN FALSE
ADVERTISING CLAIMS AND INCORPORATION OF PRUDENTIAL
STANDING IN STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES LAW: THE
QUEST FOR OPTIMAL LEVELS OF ACCURATE INFORMATION IN
THE MARKETPLACE
Kevin M. Lemley*
False advertising and state deceptive trade practices laws are two laws
that should be applied to secure optimal levels of accurate information in the
marketplace, while at the same time avoiding the anticompetitive effects
caused by overenforcement. Prudential standing measures will preserve this
balance. Prudential standing consists of judge-made rules to limit jurisdic-
tion.' While a party may satisfy the minimum Article 1112 standing require-
ments (often stated as the "case or controversy" requirement),3 prudential
standing considerations may require the court to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the present case.4
This article has two significant goals. First, it addresses the circuit split
on the proper test for standing in false advertising claims under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.5 With slight modification, courts should adopt the rea-
sonable interest test as articulated in two recent opinions authored by Justice
Alito while he was sitting on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.6 Second,
this article proposes similar prudential standing considerations, along with
proposed legislative amendments, for state deceptive trade practices laws.7
This section of the article will focus primarily on Arkansas law, but the pro-
posals set forth can be applied to other jurisdictions. The linking theme
throughout this article is that unfair competition laws achieve optimal levels
* L.L.M., Intellectual Property, University of Houston Law Center, 2004; adjunct
professor at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author is an asso-
ciate with the Allen Law Firm in Little Rock, Arkansas, and monitors developments in
Eighth Circuit intellectual property law on the firm blog, the Arkansas Business Litigation
Blog (www.arbusinesslitigation.com). I owe my deepest thanks to Chuck Dougherty, Jodie
Hill, Hermann Ivester, Michael Muskheli, Jim Simpson, and Amy Stewart for their helpful
comments and assistance in reviewing earlier drafts. All my love to my wife, Jenny Lemley.
1. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Bender v. Williams-
port Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986).
2. UNITED STATES CONST. art. III.
3. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
4. See id.; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part V.
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of accurate information in the market. False advertising and state deceptive
trade practices laws are two such laws that should be applied to secure these
optimal levels in the market.
The market economy is grounded upon procompetitive behavior.
Usually, the notions of procompetitive and anticompetitive behavior conjure
images of industry cartels fixing prices and limiting supply. However, in-
formation affects the competitive behavior of market participants. Accurate
information fosters competitive conduct, while misinformation leads to anti-
competitive conduct. Inequalities in the market created by misinformation
can create harmful, if not devastating, effects on the market.8
The analysis does not end with the behavior of market participants. In-
formation regulation also affects the competitive balance of the market. In-
formation regulation must seek to achieve optimal levels of accurate infor-
mation, not a complete abrogation of misinformation. Overenforcement of
market inequalities caused by misinformation can lead to property rights in
accurate information and ultimately cause equal or stronger anticompetitive
harm than the inequalities they seek to redress. Proper enforcement of false
advertising and state deceptive trade practices laws will yield procompeti-
tive effects by alleviating market inequalities caused by misinformation.
This article will demonstrate why prudential standing measures will
ensure proper enforcement of the Lanham Act and state deceptive trade
practices laws to promote optimal levels of accurate information in the mar-
ket. To accomplish this task, it will be necessary to explore the origins and
development of both laws. Part I presents an overview of false advertising
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Part II discusses the legislative his-
tory and case law interpretation of section 43(a). Part III analyzes the rea-
sonable interest test to evaluate prudential standing for false advertising.
Part IV presents the relationship of false advertising law and state deceptive
trade practices laws. Part V discusses Arkansas laws affecting false advertis-
ing and makes suggestions to incorporate prudential standing measures for
deceptive trade practices claims into Arkansas law. By adopting these meas-
ures, courts can apply the Lanham Act and deceptive trade practices laws to
secure optimal levels of accurate information in the marketplace and avoid
the anticompetitive effects caused by overenforcement.
8. The Enron scandal still remains a popular example of the devastating effects of
misinformation supplied to the market. For a thorough examination of Enron, see generally
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1139 (2005).
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I. OVERVIEW OF FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER SECTION 43(A) OF THE
LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act is the federal statute controlling the law of trademarks
and unfair competition. 9 Most of the statute is devoted to trademarks, and
scholarly attention to the Lanham Act is mostly devoted to trademarks.
However, section 43(a) also codifies unfair competition and provides federal
causes of action for unfair competition and false advertising:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination the-
reof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, mi-
srepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 1
The primary focus of this article is the false advertising prong, section
43(a)(1)(B). Although section 43(a)(1)(A) is typically referred to as the
trademark infringement prong," it does incorporate the form of false adver-
tising in which a firm falsely suggests a celebrity endorses its goods or ser-
vices. 12 Ultimately, this article supports a single rule of standing to apply to
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006).
10. Id. § 1125(a).
11. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353,
361 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); see also Bruce P. Keller, "It Keeps Going
and Going and Going": The Expansion of False Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham
Act, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 131, 134 (noting this subsection is primari-
ly used to bring infringement actions for unregistered trademarks).
12. Keller, supra note 11, at 134; see also generally Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
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both prongs, and section 43(a) will be referenced in its entirety throughout
this article, although false advertising will be the primary focus.
False advertising consists of two types of false statements: "(1) literally
false factual commercial claims; and (2) literally true or ambiguous factual
claims[,] 'which implicitly convey a false impression, are misleading in
context, or are likely to deceive consumers.' ' 1 3 The courts are generally in
agreement that the plaintiff in a false advertising case must establish the
following elements: "(1) a false statement of fact that has deceived, or has
the capacity to deceive, a not insubstantial segment of the target audience,
(2) affecting interstate commerce, (3) in connection with commercial adver-
tising and promotion, (4) that is material, and (5) that is likely to cause in-
jury.'
14
A thorough examination of false advertising law requires analysis of
the constitutional underpinnings and purpose of the Lanham Act. This sec-
tion will review (1) the purpose of the Lanham Act, (2) how section 43(a)
lowers consumer search costs, and (3) the disagreement among courts re-
garding section 43(a)'s purpose.
A. The Purpose of the Lanham Act Is to Lower Consumer Search Costs
The Lanham Act serves different policy goals than the other intellec-
tual property statutes. Trademark law was undeveloped in the United States
as late as the nineteenth century, 15 and the framers of the Constitution had
no reason to include trademarks in the intellectual property clause.' 6 While
the Patent Act 17 and the Copyright Act 8 took force to "promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts,"' 9 trademark law developed to protect the
integrity of the marketplace.2 °
Different social goals drive the different forms of intellectual proper-
ty.21 Patent and copyright law serve to achieve optimal levels of innovation;
trademark law lowers consumer search costs amid the information available
13. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 2004).
14. Michael F. Clayton, Handling Unfair Competition and False Advertising Cases, 677
PLI/PAT 261, 269 (2001); Keller, supra note 11, at 140-41.
15. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 618 (4th ed. Aspen 2006) (citing LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 257 (2d ed. 1985)).
16. See UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006).
19. UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 15, at 20.
21. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in
Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1323, 1380 (2000).
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in the market.2 2 A trademark is any word, name, symbol, device, or combi-
nation thereof used to identify one's goods or services 3 and to distinguish
them from those provided by others.24 The Lanham Act prohibits a later
participant from using a trademark that is confusingly similar to an existing
trademark.2 ' Evaluating the likelihood of confusion dictates the bounds of
trademark protection. 6 Two brief illustrations show that sometimes the
trademark owner can prohibit the use of a similar mark, and sometimes he
or she cannot. Jeff Foxworthy successfully enjoined a t-shirt manufacturer
from producing t-shirts with "you ain't nothing but a redneck" jokes, as they
were confusingly similar to Foxworthy's trademark "you might be a red-
neck. ,27 Conversely, while CBS had registered its trademark, "Television
City," for its television production studio, it could not prevent a television-
themed restaurant from using the name "Television City. '28 Courts examine
a number of factors to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists,
29
which can lead to unpredictable results.3° By focusing on the effect on the
market rather than the rights of the trademark owner, trademark law has a
much more symbiotic relationship with antitrust law than with copyright or
patent law.3'
22. Id. Consumer search costs involve the selection process between similar goods.
These search costs increase when similar trademarks identify similar goods with differing
levels of quality. Trademark law serves to lower these costs by ensuring that trademarks on
competing goods are dissimilar enough so that each trademark signals its own level of quality
to consumers.
23. The Lanham Act separately defines "service mark." See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
However, the distinction is relevant only for registration purposes. As the Eighth Circuit
recently observed, "while the distinction between a trademark and a service mark may be
relevant for registration purposes, it is not particularly relevant for the purposes of the like-
lihood of confusion analysis." Mid-State Afiermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. MQVP, Inc., 466
F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int'l Select Group, Inc., 192
F.3d 1330, 1334 n.1 (11 th Cir. 1999)).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer He Can't
Refuse: A Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Dis-
putes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287, 290 (2004) (comparing the different forms of intellectual prop-
erty).
25. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
26. See id.
27. See generally Foxworthy v. Custom Trees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
28. See generally CBS, Inc. v. Liederman, 866 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
29. The classic test is the eight-factor test in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). While the approach is basically the same, circuits
apply different factors. See, e.g., Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1053-
58 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying the six-factor test adopted by the Eighth Circuit).
30. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Intellectual Property: Some Practical and Legal Fundamen-
tals, 35 IDEA 79, 125 (1994) (describing the prediction of trademark infringement as a
"black art").
31. See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 15, at 20; see also Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY
2007]
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Trademark law fosters competitive markets by improving the quality of
information but not necessarily eliminating all inaccurate information.32
Trademark law is a procompetitive tool that works to secure accurate infor-
mation to the market,3 3 but these procompetitive aims sometimes result in
limitations on trademark rights, and even windfalls to competitors. 34 Over-
enforcement of trademark rights imposes significant social costs, yielding
market inequalities, 3 5 including inefficient monopoly profits.36 Therefore,
trademark law must be constantly re-evaluated against ever-changing mar-
ket conditions to ensure the procompetitive policy goals of trademark law
are still being met.37
While the purpose of trademark law has been well defined, little atten-
tion has been provided to determining the primary policy of false advertis-
ing. Ascertaining this policy is important to develop the proper prudential
standing analysis. Prudential standing ensures that the proper party is bring-
ing a false advertising claim for an injury that was meant to be corrected by
section 43(a). This determination can be made only by exploring the policy
of section 43(a).
B. Section 43(a) Seeks to Lower Consumer Search Costs
Like trademark law in general, section 43(a) fosters competitive mar-
kets by improving the quality of information supplied to the market but not
necessarily eliminating all levels of misinformation supplied to the market.
The inclusion of false advertising in the Lanham Act shows the same policy
should apply, but a more fundamental analysis of information supply also
mandates this conclusion. Trademarks and advertising both convey informa-
tion to consumers. Trademarks signal the source of goods; consumers can
immediately link the level of quality with the source. Once the consumer has
consumed a Coca-Cola, the consumer can immediately ascertain the ex-
L.J. 461, 467 (2005) ("The primacy of competition in trademark law stands in stark contrast
with other areas of intellectual property law, which insulate creators from competition in
order to encourage future acts of creation."). Not surprisingly, standing in trademark law
differs from patent or copyright standing. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 21, at 1380.
32. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 31, at 467.
33. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 788 (2004) [hereinafter Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet]; see also Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the
Demise of "Trademark Use, " 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 371, 376 (2006) ("The ultimate purpose
of trademark protection is to foster competition.").
34. Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, supra note 33, at 792.
35. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
Yale L.J. 1687, 1696 (1999).
36. Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL'Y 35, 49 (2003).
37. Id. at 50.
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pected quality the next time he sees a Coca-Cola logo. Advertising also sig-
nals information to consumers, but advertising conveys direct information
regarding the characteristics of the goods and services.38 Through this direct
conveyance of information, advertising seeks to simultaneously inform,
influence, and persuade consumers to buy goods or services. 39 False adver-
tising, in its purest form, is misinformation supplied to the market to misin-
form, influence, and persuade consumers to buy.4° Section 43(a) regulates
the misinformation supplied to the market.
All markets consist of competitive and monopolistic elements.4 At-
tempts to eliminate all monopolistic elements through regulation will ulti-
mately yield anticompetitive effects by ignoring the established competitive
balance of "workable competition. ' ' 2 As Professor Brown observed, "pure
competition is descriptive only of an ideal, not of the real world. 43 Seeking
pure competition through the elimination of all misinformation will produce
a system of overenforcement of false advertising law. Market inequalities
will result from overenforcement, as already seen in the trademark context,44
and similar market inequalities will arise through overenforcement of false
advertising.
Overenforcement of section 43(a), whether through overextension by
competitors or permitting consumer standing, produces market inequalities.
While the costs of misinformation must be weighed against the costs of
overenforcement, often the costs of overenforcement are more destructive
than the original market inequality created by the misinformation. Competi-
tors can impose market inequalities through section 43(a) by generating
monopoly profits. Every section 43(a) lawsuit will threaten the defendant's
ability to supply information to the market, and if section 43(a) is too expan-
sive, firms can stifle their competitors' ability to supply information to the
market. Overenforcement produces twin effects on the market: (1) the de-
fendant is prevented from supplying information, and (2) the plaintiff is
permitted to obtain monetary rewards. The end result is a net reduction of
information in the market, causing it to fall below optimal levels.
Expanding the scope of section 43(a) to provide consumer standing is
even worse. Consumers impose market inequalities through opportunistic
38. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948), reprinted in Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1621-24 (1999).
39. Id.
40. See id. Professor Brown's observations analyzed the overall economic effects of
advertising rather than considering the effects of misinformation. Id.
41. Id. at 1624-25.
42. Id. at 1624 (internal quotation omitted).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 35, at 1696.
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behavior and profit seeking. Consumer standing creates a federal cause of
action for levels of misinformation in which the law traditionally would not
permit recovery. Driven by monetary relief and not competitive conditions,
the consumer always has incentives to bring the action. The net results of
this opportunistic behavior are additional social costs imposed on the mar-
ket, which will ultimately increase the costs of goods and services to all
consumers.
C. Courts Have Not Agreed on Section 43(a)'s Purpose
Courts diverge on the issue of standing to bring a false advertising
claim.45 The difficulty comes when interpreting the final sentence of section
43(a). Clearly, a competitor has standing to bring a false advertising claim
against another competitor, but how far should standing extend beyond di-
rect competitors? Read literally, section 43(a) gives standing to "any per-
son" who believes he will be harmed.46 This section has been left open to
two opposing interpretations: an expansive view that would encompass "any
person" and a narrow view that would restrict standing to competitors.
Courts also disagree on the purpose behind section 43(a). The Sixth
Circuit views section 43(a) as a statute devoted to consumer protection,48
while the Second Circuit interprets section 43(a) as an unfair competition
remedy applied "virtually without regard for the interests of consumers gen-
erally and almost certainly without any consideration of consumer rights of
action in particular., 49 These contradicting views demonstrate the problem
in interpreting section 43(a). Courts and commentators have focused on
Congressional intent and the "true" meaning, and they have tried to establish
standing based on these principles.
50
While the substantive nature of false advertising is fairly uniform,
standing to bring the cause of action is in a state of flux. The Eighth Circuit
recently observed this problem, noting a circuit split existed regarding the
requirements to establish standing in false advertising claims.51 One leading
commentator has observed that, with the exception of the Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, courts have held that a false advertising plaintiff does
45. See Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100, 1103-04
(8th Cir. 2006) (noting the circuit split).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
47. Compare Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under
the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807 (1999), with Richard A. De Sevo, Consumer Standing
Under Section 43(a)-an Issue Whose Time Has Passed, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1998).
48. Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987).
49. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971).
50. See generally id.; Bums, supra note 47; De Sevo, supra note 47.




not always have to be a direct competitor to have standing.52 Yet, courts
routinely state as a matter of law that the false advertising plaintiff must be a
competitor to have standing.5 3 The Ninth Circuit has even established sepa-
rate tests for standing under the false advertising and trademark prongs of
section 43(a). 4
It is time to bring order to the chaos and establish a single test for
standing in section 43(a) cases. To identify this test, it is necessary to ana-
lyze both the legislative history and case law development of false advertis-
ing.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
43(A)
Other commentators have examined the legislative history of the Lan-
ham Act without a singular accepted analysis of section 43(a).55 Their only
agreement is that the legislative history is scant; indeed, commentators have
used legislative history to justify both sides of the argument as to whether
consumers should have standing under section 43(a).56 Often this analysis is
restricted to the analysis provided in Colligan v. Activities Club of New
York, Ltd.57 This section will readdress the legislative history.
To understand Lanham Act standing, particularly section 43(a) stand-
ing, it is also necessary to review trademark law back to its origins. Because
trademarks were not included in the Intellectual Property Clause, trademark
and unfair competition law experienced a unique evolution through the twin
prongs of statutory and common law.5 8 This section will outline the devel-
opment of the interpretation of section 43(a). First, this section will discuss
how a restrictive view of the Commerce Clause in the late nineteenth cen-
52. 4 MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:32 (4th
ed. West 2006).
53. See, e.g., Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407
F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 209 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also generally Elizabeth Williams, Standard to Bring False Advertising Claim
or Unfair Competition Claim Under § 43(a)(1) of Lanham Act, 124 A.L.R. FED. 189 (1995).
54. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
plaintiff under the false association prong must show a "commercial interest in the product
wrongfully identified," while a plaintiff under the false advertising prong must show a "dis-
cernibly competitive injury").
55. See generally Bums, supra note 47; De Sevo, supra note 47; Keller, supra note 11;
see also generally Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be
the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1984).
56. Compare Bums, supra note 47, at 887-88 (concluding consumers should have
standing), with De Sevo, supra note 47, at 40-41 (concluding consumers should not have
standing).
57. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
58. See infra Part II.A.
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tury forced trademark and unfair competition law to develop primarily
through the common law.59 Second, this section will address Congress's first
opportunity to enact an expansive trademark law that codified the common
law. 60 Next, this section will discuss how the issue of consumer standing for
false advertising came to the forefront of the discussion and how the Su-
preme Court provided guidance on prudential standing in antitrust law.
61
Finally, this section will review the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.62
A. The Restrictive View of the Commerce Clause in the Late Nineteenth
Century Forced Common Law Development of Trademark and Unfair
Competition Laws
The original trademark statute6 3 was struck down as unconstitutional
because it rested its authority on the Intellectual Property Clause. 64 Congress
created a new trademark act under its Commerce Clause powers in 1881,65
but this act was more limited in scope than its predecessor.66 This was an era
when the Supreme Court held a restrictive view of the Commerce Clause,67
and the Supreme Court frequently struck down laws passed under the Com-
merce Clause power. 68 Congress passed trademark acts in 190569 and
1920,70 but the Court's continued restrictive view prevented Congress from
passing a broad, unifying statute.7' Unfair competition law developed
through the common law,72 and for the most part, federal unfair competition
was limited to passing off and protecting trade names.73
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
74
The Court declared that no federal, general common law existed, 5 and it
59. See infra Part H.A.
60. See infra Part I.B.
61. See infra Part I.C-D.
62. See infra Part ILE.
63. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
64. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
65. See Act ofMar. 3, 1881, ch. 138,21 Stat. 502.
66. Compare id., with Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
67. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3.3
(Aspen 1997).
68. Id.
69. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, repealed by Lanham
Act of 1946, § 46(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
70. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, Pub. L. No. 66-163, 41 Stat. 533, repealed by Lan-
ham Act of 1946, § 46(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946).
71. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, § 3.3.3.
72. For a summary of key unfair competition decisions prior to 1946, see Bauer, supra
note 55, at 673-78.
73. Bums, supra note 47, at 814.
74. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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was widely agreed that the Erie decision eliminated the existing body of
federal unfair competition common law.76 At the same time, the Court began
an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The Erie decision
coincided with the beginning of a significant era (1937-1995) during which
the Court did not overrule a single Commerce Clause law.77
B. Congress Is Finally Able to Pass an Expansive Trademark Law and
Codify the Common Law Eradicated by Erie Railroad Co.
With the Court now receptive to its Commerce Clause power, Congress
was set to pass the type of broad trademark statute it had set out to create in
the nineteenth century. Congress also had the task of deciding what to do
with the common law developed since the Trade-Mark Cases78 that had
been somewhat abrogated by Erie Railroad. Congress chose to codify that
common law79 and enacted the Lanham Act in 1946.80 Primarily because the
body of common law was not overly expansive, section 43(a) garnered little
attention. 81 In fact, the original section 43(a) said nothing about advertis-
ing.
82
The exclusion of advertising is not surprising considering (1) false ad-
vertising never came up in the common law, 83 and (2) the prevailing anti-
trust views concerning advertising were drastically different from the mod-
em view.84 During this era, advertising was viewed as an unnatural stimu-
lant of demand that forged oligopoly through artificial price discrimina-
tion.85 It would not be until the 1960s and 1970s that economists began to
view advertising more favorably, 86 and not until 1976 that the Supreme
75. Id. at 78.
76. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 27:7.
77. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, § 3.3.4; see also Bums, supra note 47, at 811-12 (at
the time of the Lanham Act, Congress passed a series of business regulatory laws that were
approved by the Supreme Court).
78. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
79. See S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
80. See generally 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
81. Bauer, supra note 55, at 679.
82. Bums, supra note 47, at 814.
83. Id.
84. MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 15, at 620 (citing JOAN ROBINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 89 (1933)); see also generally Beverly W. Pattishall,
Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REv. 967 (1952).
85. MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 15, at 620.
86. Id. at 621 (citing Thomas T. Nagle, Do Advertising-Profitability Studies Really Show
that Advertising Creates a Barrier to Entry?, 24 J.L. & ECON. 333 (1981); Phillip Nelson,
Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974); George Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961)).
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Court viewed advertising as indispensable to the free market.87 All told,
Congress had no reason to address false advertising in 1946.
In 1954, the Third Circuit held in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lo-
bell, Inc., that section 43(a) provided a cause of action for false advertis-
ing.88L 'Aiglon was the first case to make such a holding. 89 False advertising
emerged as a cause of action under section 43(a), but the courts remained
split on this issue.90 Even into the 1980s, some courts refused to recognize a
claim for false advertising under section 43(a),91 and the courts that did rec-
ognize false advertising were left to define the contours of the claim through
standing.
C. Consumer Standing in False Advertising Cases Comes to the Forefront
The Second Circuit, in Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,
was the first to deal with consumer standing for a false advertising claim
under section 43(a).92 The claim was a consumer class action brought by
two high school students on behalf of two classes comprising at least 153
students.93 The defendant advertised a weekend ski tour that included ski
lessons, equipment, and proper transportation, 94 but the tour became a disas-
ter.95 Only one instructor showed, there was not enough equipment for the
students, and one of the buses broke down in the middle of the night.96 In
considering Colligan, the court faced a monumental decision: a ruling for
the plaintiffs would have interpreted section 43(a) as conveying a federal
cause of action for consumer class actions, regardless of the injury.
The Colligan court entertained the question without guidance from the
Supreme Court or a clearly articulated policy from Congress. The plaintiffs
87. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976). The Court went so far as to say consumers have a right to receive information from
commercial speakers. See id. at 756. Society has "a general interest in commercial advertising
because advertising helps consumers decide how to allocate their resources in a free-market
economy." John M.A. DiPippa, Regulating Food Advertisements: Some First Amendment
Issues, 28 U. ARru. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 413, 415 (2006) (providing a thorough analysis of
advertising in the context of commercial speech rights). The Court retreated from its position
of treating commercial speech as a unique First Amendment right in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). See id. at 418-22.
88. 214 F.2d 649, 650 (3d Cir. 1954).
89. Keller, supra note 11, at 132.
90. Id. at 132-33.
91. Id.; see also Bauer, supra note 55, at 737 (opining that courts were interpreting false
advertising under section 43(a) too narrowly).
92. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971).
93. Id. at 687.
94. Id.




based their argument on the phrase "any person., 97 The plaintiffs argued this
language was so plain and unambiguous it could only confer standing to
consumers.98 The court rejected this reasoning and turned to Judge Learned
Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition."99
After examining the history of the Lanham Act, the court focused on section
45, which provides as follows: "The intent of this chapter ... is to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition."'100 The court
concluded that section 43(a) created a limited unfair competition remedy for
a limited class of commercial plaintiffs.l0
The holding and reasoning of Colligan has received much attention,
but commentators rarely discuss the facts of the case.10 2 The court was abso-
lutely right in its conclusion because the misinformation at issue regarded a
ski trip that did not meet the expectations of its participants. Permitting a
federal class action lawsuit for this type of misinformation would have
stretched section 43(a) beyond its intended scope. These types of misinfor-
mation are better left for state courts to apply state law, such as breach of
contract.
It is easy to see how commentators overlooked the injury at issue in
Colligan-so did the court. The court limited its standing analysis to what
person would have standing rather than the more appropriate task of focus-
ing on what type of injury may confer standing. Courts followed the Colli-
gan rule that consumers do not have standing 10 3 and continued to focus on
the party, rather than the injury, to evaluate standing. This is an efficient
analysis for the courts to apply but a superficial one. Instead, courts should
focus on the procompetitive policy aspects of false advertising, which
mandate analysis of the injury above the party.
Had the Colligan court been faced with an indirect competitor, pruden-
tial standing may have developed with an emphasis on the injury. Nonethe-
less, by denying consumer standing, the court established a measure of pru-
dential standing to determine who was a proper party for a section 43(a)
false advertising claim.
During the 1980s, plaintiffs tried to create consumer standing through
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).'04 Like the
97. Id. at 689.
98. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 689.
99. Id. at 689 (citing NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)).
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id. at 692.
102. See generally Bauer, supra note 55; Bums, supra note 47; De Sevo, supra note 47.
103. See generally, e.g., Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club,
Inc., 407 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005); Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2002); see also generally Williams, supra note 53.
104. Keller, supra note 11, at 138.
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Lanham Act, RICO was not intended to federalize every facet of potential
consumer harm.1 °5 Therefore, these suits were largely unsuccessful 0 6 be-
cause courts reasoned that the prudential standing requirement would be
stretched only far enough to permit suits by indirect competitors 10 7 or con-
sumers with substantial commercial interests.10 8 But, the prudential standing
requirements remained constant in that a competitive injury and some de-
gree of competition was required to have standing for a section 43(a) false
advertising claim.
D. The Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Prudential Standing in Anti-
trust Law
A series of Supreme Court antitrust decisions set the stage for evaluat-
ing standing for section 43(a) claims. In 1978, the Court held against a liter-
al interpretation of isolated statutory language in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States.'0 9 Evaluating the Sherman Act, the Court
noted that a literal interpretation would render every contract invalid as a
restraint of trade." ° The Court also concluded that the legislative history of
the Sherman Act showed Congressional intent to maintain judicial guidance
in determining what actions constitute antitrust violations.' Additionally,
the Court addressed the effect of common law prudential standing principles
in relation to legislative action." 2 These decisions culminated into a rule of
statutory interpretation that Congress is presumed to incorporate prudential
standing unless the new statute expressly negates it. 113
In 1983, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in Asso-
ciated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,"
14
focusing on the nature of the injury to determine standing in antitrust cas-
es." 5 The parties were engaged in collective bargaining agreements, 16 and a
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See generally Williams, supra note 53 (summarizing cases in which standing was
granted or denied to indirect competitors).
108. See generally Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984) (major share-
holder of failed company had false advertising standing).
109. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
110. Id.at687-88.
111. Id. at 688.
112. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544 (1996); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
113. See generally Bennett, 520 U.S. 154; United Food, 517 U.S. 544; Gladstone, 441
U.S. 91; Warth, 422 U.S. 490.
114. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 520.
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labor union brought suit against a membership corporation of general con-
tractors.'" 7 The thrust of the union's complaint was that the corporation took
measures to weaken the agreements.118 At issue was standing under section
4 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the dis-
trict in which the defendant resides."" 9 The Court noted that a literal reading
would grant standing to anyone directly or indirectly harmed by an antitrust
violation. 120 Instead, the Court considered the legislative history and the
common law backdrop that existed when the antitrust laws were passed.
121
The Court determined that Congress passed the antitrust laws with an intent
to maintain the existing principles developed in the common law,' 22 which
had established that antitrust standing would be limited to certain injuries
caused by antitrust violations, rather than apply a literal reading of section 4
of the Clayton Act.123 The Court focused on the injury, holding that five
factors are to be evaluated to determine standing:
(1) Whether the plaintiff's alleged injury is of a type that Congress
sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of the anti-
trust laws; 1
24
(2) The directness or indirectness of the injury;
125
(3) The plaintiffs proximity to the injurious conduct; 1
26
(4) The degree to which the plaintiff's damages are speculative; 127 and
(5) Risk of either duplicative damages or complex apportionment of
damages. 1
28
After analyzing these factors, the Court determined that the Union did not
have standing to bring an antitrust claim against the membership corpora-
tion. 1
29
117. Id. at 521.
118. Id. at 522.
119. Id. at 520, 529 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)).
120. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529.
121. Id. at 531-32.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 534. This interpretation is opposite from the analysis of section 45 of the Lan-
ham Act that supporters of consumer standing use to justify that Congress intended to grant
consumer standing for false advertising claims. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127-29 (2006).
124. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538 (internal quotations omitted).
125. Id. at 540.
126. Id. at 541-42.
127. Id. at 542.
128. Id. at 543-44.
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Now, the stage was set to determine standing for section 43(a). The
federal courts had developed a clear line of prudential standing denying con-
sumers standing, although it was a party-focused analysis. The Supreme
Court rejected the approach of literally interpreting isolated statutory text to
create a broader cause of action than was intended by the statute. The Court
also firmly set the statutory interpretation rule that a statute was presumed to
incorporate prudential standing unless Congress expressly negated pruden-
tial standing. Moreover, the Court issued a five-factor test to evaluate anti-
trust standing, which was an injury-focused approach that should have been
applied to section 43(a) cases in the first place. All that was missing was a
Lanham Act revision to see how Congress reacted to the current state of
prudential standing measures applied in false advertising cases.
E. The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
Congress enacted the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA)
130
primarily to correct inconsistencies in section 43(a) cases.' 3 1 There were two
major goals: (1) codify the common law decisions that made false advertis-
ing actionable and (2) remove some of the restrictions developed through
that common law. 132 For instance, the TLRA did away with the "inherent
characteristic" requirement1 33 and the distinction between statements about
the firm's own goods as opposed to statements about its competitors. 34
The TLRA did nothing to affect prudential standing that had developed
in the courts. Surely Congress was aware of the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation rule that prudential standing would remain unless Congress
had expressly abrogated it. The issue of consumer standing was addressed in
the legislative history, and a proposed amendment to add consumer standing
was defeated.135 A leading proponent for consumer standing was Represent-
129. Id. at 545-46. The Supreme Court again held against abrogation of prudential stand-
ing in an environmental case. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
130. Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72 (1988)).
131. Keller, supra note 11, at 134.
132. Id. at 134, 137.
133. Id. at 136. Under this requirement, the false statement was actionable only if it was
directed to an inherent characteristic of the goods at issue. See generally, e.g., Fur Info. &
Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974) (false adver-
tising claim dismissed because advertisement, although conveying a false message about the
fur garment industry, did not make a false statement regarding the characteristics of imitation
furs).
134. Keller, supra note 11, at 136-37. Prior to 1988, only a firm's statements about its
own goods or services were actionable. Id. Thus, finns could make false statements about
competitors' goods or services without being subject to false advertising claims. See id.
135. 134 CONG. REc. H10411, 10419-23 (1988).
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ative Kastenmeir, who published an article in favor of consumer standing'
36
and declared on the floor of the House his belief that consumers already had
standing under the 1946 Lanham Act. 137 Professor McCarthy viewed these
statements as "only an optimistic opinion by a representative whose propos-
al was defeated in a House-Senate compromise."' 138 Moreover, these floor
comments were worthless for interpretative guidance because the courts had
already developed a seventeen-year history of prudential standing. This
backdrop of prudential standing makes analysis of the 1946 Lanham Act
meaningless; instead, analysis should focus upon any comments directed to
standing made in the TLRA. 139 Here, Congress made its intent quite clear:
"It is the committee's intention that.., standing under Section 43(a) contin-
ue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that the amendments it made
to the legislation with respect to these issues should not be regarded as either
limiting or extending applicable decisional law."'1
40
Far from demonstrating an express intent to negate prudential standing,
Congress was clear it wished to retain it.' 4 1 Entrusting the courts to develop
prudential standing was a directive similar to Congress's intent for the
courts to develop antitrust law through prudential interpretation of the
Sherman Act.
142
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT REFINES THE REASONABLE INTEREST TEST FOR
STANDING IN FALSE ADVERTISING CASES
While the TLRA left prudential standing intact, the courts were left
yearning for the Supreme Court's guidance to establish a uniform rule.
143
Professor McCarthy advocated use of the principles of antitrust standing
articulated in Associated General Contractors in false advertising cases. 44
With this application, competitors and even noncompetitors would have
standing; the injury would determine standing. 145 Other commentators also
136. See generally Robert W. Kastenmeir & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and
Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEG. 301 (1978). The House
Judiciary Committee endorsed statements from Representative Kastenmeir in this article. See
H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 7-8 (1988).
137. 134 CONG. REC. H10419 (Oct. 19, 1988).
138. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 27.04.
139. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544 (1996); Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
140. S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604.
141. Id.
142. Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
143. A Westlaw search of sy,di("false advertising") in the United States Supreme Court
database reveals no cases (last performed Oct. 15, 2006).




suggested use of the antitrust standing analysis, but they misapplied the
analysis in attempts to create consumer standing for false advertising
claims.
1 46
Justice Alito, then sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, participated in a number of key antitrust decisions 147 that cul-
minated in a test for false advertising standing based on antitrust prin-
ciples. 48 The Third Circuit had adopted the reasonable interest test in
1984,149 but it was Justice Alito's opinions that defined and provided the
legal framework of the "reasonable interest."
'1 50
A. Conte Brothers Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc.
Quaker State marketed a Teflon-based engine lubricant called Slick
50,'51 and Quaker State advertised that Slick 50 could be substituted for mo-
tor oil.' 52 These advertisements were false, and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion forced Quaker State to cease making these statements. 153 Conte Broth-
ers, which was a retail seller of motor oils that competed with Slick 50,154
brought a false advertising class action against Quaker State on behalf of all
such retail sellers, 55 but the district court dismissed the complaint for lack
of standing. 1
56
The Conte Bros. court had a different issue before it than the Colligan
court, whose analysis was limited to whether the 1946 Lanham Act gave
standing to consumers for false advertising claims. 157 The Colligan decision
created a rule of prudential standing that limited the types of plaintiffs that
146. See generally Burns, supra note 47; Jean Wegman Bums, The Paradox of Antitrust
and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA L. REv. 47 (1994); Tawnya Wojciechowski, Note,
Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Argument for Congressional Action Regarding
Consumer Standing for False Advertising Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 Sw. U. L.
REV. 213 (1994).
147. See generally Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2001);
Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998); Barton &
Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997); Lerman v. Joyce
Int'l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998
F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 998 F.2d 1129 (3d Cir.
1991); Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 930 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1991).
148. See generally Conte Bros., 165 F.3d 221; Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d 164.
149. See generally Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984).
150. See generally Conte Bros., 165 F.3d 221; Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d 164. These
were landmark decisions, but they did not even produce case notes in legal journals.
151. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 223-24.
152. Id. at 224.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 223.
155. Id. at223-24.
156. Id. at 223.
157. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 688-92 (2d Cir. 1971).
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could bring a false advertising claim.158 At issue before the Conte Bros.
court was the effect of the 1988 Lanham Act on this established common
law of prudential standing.1 59 Namely, the court set out to determine if Con-
gress had eliminated prudential standing in false advertising cases by pas-
sage of the 1988 Lanham Act.160 The court acknowledged that "[a]s a matter
of statutory interpretation[,] . .. Congress is presumed to incorporate back-
ground prudential standing principles, unless the statute expressly negates
them."''6 This rule of interpretation places a level of presumption in favor of
maintaining current standing principles-prudential standing remains in
"force unless expressly negated by Congress."'
' 62
To make this determination, the court examined the statutory text,
structure, and legislative history.' 63 The court turned to section 45, which
provided the stated purpose of the Lanham Act: "The congressionally-stated
purpose of the Lanham act, far from indicating an express intent to abrogate
prudential standing doctrine, evidences an intent to limit standing to a nar-
row class of potential plaintiffs possessing interests the protection of which
furthers the purposes of the Lanham Act.
1 64
The court held this statement of purpose, unchanged since 1946,
showed a lack of Congressional intent to eliminate prudential standing.
165
Additionally, the court highlighted the clause discussing parties: "to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition."'166 This lan-
guage in section 45 has remained intact since the original passage in 1946.167
Accordingly, the Lanham Act provides redress for anti-competitive conduct
in a commercial context, such that standing should be limited to parties with
a commercial or competitive interest to protect.1
68
The court subsequently turned to legislative history, finding emphasis
on anti-competitive conduct in the commercial arena in both the 1946169 and
1988170 acts. Nothing in the legislative history would suggest Congressional
intent to drastically alter trademark law by introducing consumers as a new
breed of plaintiffs. 17 Predecessor trademark statutes limited the potential
158. Id. at 692.
159. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 226-27.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 229.
165. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 229.
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Pub. L. No. 489, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 412, 429).
168. Id. at 229.
169. Id. (citing 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275).
170. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604).
171. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 229-30.
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class of plaintiffs and were drafted amidst prudential standing doctrines that
limited standing, 72 and Congress never demonstrated intent, under the Lan-
ham Act or predecessor acts, to abrogate prudential standing. 173 Based on
the text of the Lanham Act and its legislative history, the court determined
that Congress did not intend to abrogate prudential standing under section
43(a).
174
The court then shifted its focus to defining the contours of prudential
standing for false advertising cases, analyzing its earlier decisions that de-
termined standing based on the plaintiffs reasonable interest. 75 However,
these decisions failed to provide a proper framework for evaluating reasona-
ble interest. 176 Following the suggestion of Professor McCarthy'7 7 and the
Restatement (Third) of Competition,7 8 the court adopted the test set forth in
Associated General Contractors'79 to determine standing under section
43(a). 180 As the first court of appeals to adopt this test, the court made care-
ful evaluation of the following factors: (1) nature of the injury, (2) directness
of the injury, (3) proximity to or remoteness from the injurious conduct, (4)
risk that damages are speculative, (5) duplicative damages or complexity in
apportioning damages, and (6) policy of the reasonable interest test.
1. Nature of the Injury
The Third Circuit has noted that the purpose of the Lanham Act is to
redress commercial harms;' 8' therefore, the plaintiff must establish a com-
mercial interest that has been harmed. 8 2 The court reiterated that even a
172. Id. at 230.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See generally Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993); Thorn v.
Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984).
176. See generally Serbin, 11 F.3d 1163; Thorn, 736 F.2d 929; Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at
233.
177. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 27.32 n.1 ("In the author's opinion, some limit on the
§ 43(a) standing of persons remote from the directly impacted party should be applied by
analogy to antitrust law, such as use of the criteria listed in Associated General Contractors
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).").
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 cmt. f (1995) ("In determining
whether an asserted injury is sufficiently direct to justify the imposition of liability, the Su-
preme Court's analysis of similar issues under federal antitrust law may offer a useful analo-
gy.").
179. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).





non-competitor may have standing, provided a commercial harm is at
stake.i
8 3
With this analysis, the court established the minimum level of market
inequality that could be corrected through section 43(a). While these correc-
tions are not necessarily limited to direct competitors, a commercial harm
must have occurred. 184 The court maintained the long-standing rule that con-
sumers do not have standing under section 43(a), but it stated the rule in
terms of the types of redress provided by the Lanham Act. 85 By doing so,
the court indicated policy considerations of trademark law would apply to
false advertising. 1
86
2. Directness of the Injury
The directness factor prevents any commercial party from asserting a
false advertising claim against any other commercial party.187 All businesses
compete for consumer dollars; theoretically, all businesses are in some de-
gree of competition with each other. If a linen store misrepresents the quali-
ty of its bath towels, and consumers spend more money on bath towels,
those dollars are unavailable for consumers to purchase clothes. Theoretical-
ly, the clothing store has been harmed because consumers now have fewer
dollars to buy clothes. This was essentially the argument Conte Brothers
offered-any sales of Slick 50 meant fewer dollars available to purchase
motor oil. 88 The court rejected this argument, noting that even consumers
whose purchases were influenced by false advertising were more direct.
189
The court held that Conte Brothers must establish either (1) a competitive
harm or (2) direct or indirect harm to its reputation or goodwill,' 90 and be-
cause Conte Brothers could establish only lost sales at the retail level,' 9' it
did not satisfy either prong of the directness factor.'
92
3. Proximity to, or Remoteness from, the Injurious Conduct
The proximity/remoteness factor is closely related to the directness fac-
tor, but it serves the ultimate policy goal of determining whether the present




186. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 224, 235.
189. Id. at 234-35.
190. Id.
191. id.
192. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234-35.
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This factor serves that policy by analyzing the effect on the market if any
given plaintiff is granted standing for a section 43(a) claim. 93 The more
direct competitors that are available in the market, the less likely it is that an
indirect competitor will achieve standing. If the more indirect competitor is
granted standing, all of the more direct competitors will consequently have
standing. This factor permits a court to examine whether granting standing
to the current plaintiff, which would grant standing to other more direct
competitors, would impose more costs on the market than the false advertis-
ing at issue.
Conte Brothers was remote from the injurious conduct. 94 More direct
competitors would have normal motivations to vindicate the public inter-
est.' 95 Allowing such a remote competitor to have standing for a false adver-
tising claim would yield overenforcement of section 43(a) by permitting too
many parties to have standing for the same challenged conduct. 96 There-
fore, Conte Brothers was too remote from the injurious conduct to be
granted standing.
4. Risk That Damages Are Speculative
Under the Conte Bros. analysis, this is actually a two-part factor that
considers (1) if the damages are speculative and (2) if they are avoidable.
197
At best, Conte Brothers could articulate only a theoretical reputational harm
for selling a product that had been falsely advertised. 198 Although Conte
Brothers chose to sell only other products, Quaker State did not prevent
Conte Brothers from selling Slick 50.199 In fact, the court reasoned, Conte
Brothers would have profited from the false advertising had they stocked
Slick 50.200 If consumers had been deceived into buying Slick 50, Conte
Brothers would have enjoyed increased sales.20 ' The fact that Conte Broth-
ers chose to stock only other products did not convert its speculative claim
into a concrete harm.202
193. Id.
194. Id. at 234.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 235.
197. Id.







5. Duplicative Damages or Complexity in Apportioning Damages
This factor examines the results of granting standing to the instant
plaintiff.203 Had the court granted standing to Conte Brothers, then every
party in the distribution chain would also have a false advertising claim
against Quaker State.2° Such a result would threaten to clog the federal
courts with insignificant cases.205 The court elaborated as follows:
If every retailer had a cause of action for false advertising regardless of
the amount in controversy, regardless of any impact on the retailer's abil-
ity to compete, regardless of any impact on the retailer's good will or
reputation, and regardless of the remote nature of the injury suffered, the
impact on the federal courts could be significant.
20
6
This congestion of insignificant cases would run afoul of section
43(a)'s purpose of resurrecting federal unfair competition law after Erie
Railroad.
0 7
This factor works in conjunction with the third factor to ascertain the
effect on the market if standing is granted. Even if the third factor weighs in
favor of standing, this factor examines the effects of other similarly situated
parties having standing. If granting standing to the current plaintiff would
generate more market harm than the false advertising at issue, it should
weigh against standing.
A good way to analyze the third and fifth factors is that the standing
analysis does not look at the instant lawsuit with blinders. Because section
43(a) promotes competitive behavior, the court must be careful that permit-
ting a section 43(a) claim does not promote anticompetitive behavior. Al-
lowing standing in a certain case could represent the old axiom that hard
cases make bad law.
6. Policy of the Reasonable Interest Test
The court closed with an observation that the Associated General Con-
tractors test "provides appropriate flexibility in application to address fac-
tually disparate scenarios that may arise in the future, while at the same time
supplying a principled means for addressing standing under both prongs of
[section] 43(a). 2 0 The court rejected the approach of the Ninth Circuit that
203. Id.
204. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 235.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
208. Conte Bros., 165 F.3dat 236.
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adopted different standards for the different prongs of section 43(a).209 As
discussed above, the five factors set forth in Conte Bros. serve the ultimate
purpose of section 43(a). The reasonable interest test seeks to grant standing
when it would foster procompetitive behavior and to deny standing when it
would foster anticompetitive behavior. The test constructs the proper
framework to serve the policy without narrowing false advertising, and the
test is flexible and can adapt to different situations as they are presented.
Shortly after the Conte Bros. decision, the court was given the opportunity
to refine the reasonable interest test.
B. Joint Stock Society v. UDVNorth America, Inc.
The Third Circuit, again in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, was
soon presented with a false advertising case in which to apply the new test
for standing.2 1 ° Joint Stock Society ("Joint Stock") was a vodka trading
house in Russia. 211 The Joint Stock family had produced vodka in Russia
since the 1860s under the labels "Smirnov" and "Smirnoff," after the sur-
name of the founder, Piotr Arsenvitch SmiMov. 21 2 Joint Stock never sold
vodka in the United States.21 3 UDV had been selling vodka under the "Smir-
noff' label in the United States since 1934.214 UDV held seventeen trade-
mark registrations for "SmiMoff.,, 21 5 Joint Stock brought an action against
UDV under both prongs of section 43(a),2 16 basing its claims on UDV's use
of the "Smirnoff' label and its use of the Smirnoff family crest, insignia,
emblems, and medals.2 17 Joint Stock also included two counts under the
Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act218 for the same activities
that formed the basis of its section 43(a) counts.219
The district court granted summary judgment to UDV for lack of stand-
ing. 220 The district court held that Joint Stock lacked Article III standing
because it had not meaningfully or adequately prepared to begin selling
209. Id. at 232, 236.
210. See generally Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2001).
211. Id. at 170.
212. Id. at 168.
213. Id. at 170.
214. Id. at 170-71.
215. Id. at 171.
216. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 171-72.
217. Id.
218. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2531-36 (2006).
219. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 172-73. The complaint also included some counts
against UDV's registered trademarks, but discussion of these counts is beyond the scope of
this article. Id. at 175.
220. Id. at 173.
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vodka in the United States.221 The district court also held that Joint Stock
failed to establish prudential standing for both the Lanham Act and decep-
tive trade practices claims.222 The Third Circuit affirmed, holding Joint
Stock lacked Article III standing because they had not marketed vodka in
the United States and were not prepared to sell vodka in the United States.223
The court did, however, clarify that a noncompetitor could have standing in
a false advertising claim if the noncompetitor could satisfy the prudential
224standing test. Because the district court made a ruling on prudential stand-
ing, the Third Circuit was able to apply its new prudential standing test de-
veloped in Conte Bros.,225 and it took this opportunity to clarify the five
factors of its test by relying on principles set forth in prior antitrust cases.226
1. Nature of the Injury
The court stated that the plaintiff must show an injury that flows from
the false advertising.227 Joint Stock attempted to "shotgun" a series of pro-
posed injuries to satisfy prudential standing. First, Joint Stock argued it was
"inevitable and imminent" that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms would deny its application to import vodka with the Smirnov label.
228
The court disagreed, stating it was UDV's prior use of the Smirnoff mark,
not false advertising, that prohibited Joint Stock's use of Smirnov in the
United States.229 Second, Joint Stock claimed injury because it could not
enter into distribution contracts in the United States.230 Again, the court held
this injury was caused by UDV's prior use of the Smirnoff mark.231 Third,
Joint Stock claimed UDV's false advertising that Smirnoff vodka came from
Russia caused harm to manufacturers of Russian vodka.232 The court held
that while this was a proper false advertising injury,233 Joint Stock could not
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 176.
224. Id. at 180.
225. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 173, 179.
226. Id. at 179 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)), 179-80 (citing Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983)), 180
(citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
227. Id. at 180 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489) (Antitrust injury must "flow[] from
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.").
228. Id. at 175, 180.
229. Id. at 177-78, 180-81.
230. Id. at 181.





assert it because it had neither actually suffered, nor was it ever under an
imminent threat of suffering this injury.234
2. Directness of the Injury
The court explained the directness of the injury factor as follows: "The
issue under this factor is whether the defendants' conduct has had a direct
effect on either the plaintiffs or the market in which they participate.
' 235
Joint Stock provided evidence that Russian vodka manufacturers would
have a direct injury.236 There was no doubt UDV's packaging of Smirnoff
vodka conveyed the impression it was from Russia,237 and Joint Stock pre-
sented a study showing a substantial number of consumers believed Smir-
noff is made in Russia. 238 The court held this factor would favor standing for
a Russian importer who could claim diminished sales; 239 however, Joint
Stock was "more attenuated" because they had not sold any vodka in the
United States.24 ° Joint Stock could claim only that the United States market
would be less profitable once they did enter.24' Thus, Joint Stock's injury
was too indirect, and this factor weighed against standing.242
Joint Stock's efforts to establish directness of injury are important for
two reasons. First, the court seemed to approve the use of survey evidence to
establish directness of the injury. The court's approval of survey evidence
will guide future plaintiffs attempting to establish standing. Second, it sheds
more light on the relationship between false advertising and trademark law
because survey evidence is the standard tool used to establish trademark
infringement.243
3. Proximity to, or Remoteness from, the Injurious Conduct
Under the Joint Stock decision, this factor determines whether there is




237. Joint Stock Soc y, 266 F.3d at 181.





243. See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d
110, 118-20 (3d Cir. 2004); Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 974 (10th
Cir. 2002); Big Dog Motorcycles, LLC v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1312,




vate them to vindicate the public interest' by bringing an enforcement ac-
tion.,,244 "The existence of such a class diminishes the justification for al-
lowing a more remote party... to perform the office of a private attorney
general., 245 The court noted that Russian vodka manufacturers who were
currently selling in the United States constituted such a class and were more
proximate to the injurious conduct.246 Such manufacturers would have a
stronger commercial interest to protect than Joint Stock.2 47 The court ex-
plained that this factor does not require the plaintiff to be a direct competi-
tor, but "a direct competitor will usually have a stronger commercial interest
than a noncompetitor. ' 48
4. Risk That Damages Are Speculative
According to the court, any calculation of damages for Joint Stock
would have been speculative because Joint Stock had not established a mar-
249ket presence in the United States. Joint Stock offered three damages cal-
culations: (1) reasonable royalty rate for UDV's use of the Smirnoff name;
(2) costs of Joint Stock's corrective advertising; and (3) disgorgement of
UDV's profits.250 All three calculations were unavailing. Joint Stock cited
no cases in which a false advertising plaintiff was awarded a reasonable
royalty rate,25' and the corrective advertising and defendant's profits calcu-
lations could be claimed by any plaintiff.252 The court rejected the latter as-
sertion because damages must be particular to the plaintiff to satisfy this
factor;253 otherwise, this factor would be meaningless because a plaintiff
could always satisfy it by claiming remedial advertising and disgorgement
of profits.2 54
244. Joint Stock Socy, 266 F.3d at 182 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.
v. Cal. State.Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983)).
245. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 182-83.
248. Id. at 183 n.10.
249. Id. at 183.
250. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 183.
251. Id. A reasonable royalty rate is the preferred method of damages calculation in pa-
tent infringement cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025,
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1996). It is also available in trademark infringement cases but rarely awarded.
MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 30:85.





5. Duplicative Damages or Complexity in Apportioning Damages
The court identified three groups who could assert the damage claims
proffered by Joint Stock: (1) importers of Russian vodka doing business in
the United States; (2) all other vodka manufacturers in the American market;
and (3) all manufacturers of vodka who have not yet entered the United
States market but have taken minimal steps for entry.255 Granting standing to
Joint Stock would subject UDV to multiple lawsuits and complex appor-
tionment of damages. 6 Accordingly, this factor also weighed against stand-
ing.
257
6. The State Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claim
The Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines a proper
plaintiff as "[a] person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of
another., 258 The court concluded that standing under this state law for false
advertising activities should be no broader than prudential standing under
section 43(a).2 19 Therefore, Joint Stock lacked standing to bring its section
43(a) claims as violations of the Act as well.26 °
C. Reconciling the Reasonable Interest Test with the Policy of False Ad-
vertising to Promote Optimal Levels of Competition
The reasonable interest test strikes the appropriate balance between se-
curing accurate information in the market and prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct through overenforcement of section 43(a). False advertising is one
of the general unfair competition laws in force to promote optimal levels of
competition, 26' and this policy is served by correcting some, but not all, in-
equalities generated by misinformation supplied to the market. Section 43(a)
strives to provide causes of action for unacceptable competition, while pro-
hibiting causes of action for acceptable competition.
Some actions of misinformation are actionable, while others are not.
Too little enforcement would clearly generate anticompetitive behavior, 262
but too much enforcement would also generate anticompetitive behavior by
255. Id. at 184--85.
256. Id. at 185.
257. Id.
258. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 186 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2533 (1999)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 21, at 1380.
262. Dennis Crouch, The Social Welfare of Advertising to Children, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH.




instilling property rights in accurate information. While false advertising
creates inequalities, efforts to eradicate all levels of misinformation yield
unjustifiable costs. Finding the optimal balance between accurate and inac-
curate information benefits both competitors and consumers, but neither
party is the sole intended beneficiary of false advertising.
False advertising law should serve to ensure accurate information is
disseminated but also to avoid the overenforcement that has taken hold in
some Lanham Act cases.26 Moreover, the reasonable interest test brings
false advertising claims into harmony with other section 43 claims, which
are laser beams for specific causes of action, e.g., common law trademark
infringement, dilution, cybersquatting, and false association.265 The reasona-
ble interest test maintains this tradition of section 43 serving as a statute that
provides narrow rights for discreet commercial injuries that supply misin-
formation to the market.
Prudential standing is needed to filter false advertising lawsuits that do
not serve the purpose of achieving optimal levels of accurate information.
Prudential standing in the false advertising context addresses three basic
questions. First, has the defendant's conduct caused accuracy of information
in the marketplace to fall below acceptable levels? If so, which parties
should be able to take corrective action? When those parties are identified,
how should the misinformation be corrected? The efforts employed by
courts in previous false advertising cases work to answer these three ques-
tions. The reasonable interest test provides uniform guidance to ascertain
which inequalities should be remedied and by which parties.
In the Conte Bros. decision, the court illustrated the effects of overen-
forcement through the hypothetical of a candy bar manufacturer that falsely
represented the chocolate content of its candy bar.266 If the false representa-
tion of chocolate content was an action to correct, and anyone could correct
it, the effect on the market would be destructive.267 Every retailer, compet-
ing firm, and consumer of chocolate bars would have a cause of action
against the party that provided the misinformation regarding its chocolate
content.268 The corrective action would cause more harm to the market than
the misinformation. Conversely, assume the same firm advertises that con-
sumers will lose weight if they eat three of the firm's candy bars every day.
263. See id. at 188; see generally Lemley, supra note 35 (arguing against overprotection
of trademarks). Professor Lemley warned of the increased social costs from overprotection of
trademarks. Id. at 1696. The same principle should hold true for false advertising.
264. See supra Part I.A. (analyzing overenforcement of trademarks).
265. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).






This is a significant degree of misinformation that causes more harm to the
market than corrective action.
1. Entrusting the Market to Take Corrective Action
The market will generally correct a dissemination of false information.
Consumer behavior has a notable effect because once consumers have been
duped by misinformation, they will no longer trust the firm (or the trade-
marks identifying the firm's goods or services). Consumers will correct the
misinformation by no longer buying the firm's goods or services and by
conveying their bad experience to other consumers. Any short-term gains
from the misinformation are converted into long-term losses, as consumers
no longer trust the firm. Firms committed to long-term positions in the mar-
ket gain little from supplying misinformation.
269
Competitors also have alternatives to litigation to combat misinforma-
tion. The competitor may engage in its own positive, corrective advertising
campaign, which is often much cheaper and more effective than even suc-
cessful litigation. 270 The decisional calculus for competitors will have to
consider the likelihood the market will correct itself, the costs/benefits of its
own advertising campaign, and the risks/rewards associated with litiga-
tion.27'
To some extent, the market must retain the power to correct itself.
These corrective actions are natural market forces to remedy the inequality
created by the misinformation, and if these corrective actions were sub-
sumed by section 43(a), the results on the market would ultimately be nega-
tive.
2. Traditional Causes ofAction for Consumers and Commercial
Parties That Fail to Meet Standing
It is important to consider that the denial of section 43(a) standing is
not a denial of all remedies. Consumers still have traditional causes of ac-
tion-breach of contract, fraud, breach of warranties, and the like.272 Com-
mercial parties that lack false advertising standing may have claims for tor-
tious interference with contract, business expectancy, or other business torts.
These traditional causes of action are based on state law. The Lanham Act
was designed to coexist with state laws, and it was never meant to preempt
state law causes of action. Overenforcement of section 43(a) by granting
269. See Crouch, supra note 262, at 190-91 (explaining that the market provides disin-
centives for firms to participate in false advertising).
270. De Sevo, supra note 47, at 33-34.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 35.
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standing to too many parties would defeat the purpose of the Lanham Act to
supplement existing state laws.
3. Alternative Forms of Redress for Consumers and Competitors
Consumers and competitors have other choices to seek redress without
traditional corrective action or litigation. The National Advertising Division
of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (NAD) offers a forum for both
consumers and competitors.273 In fact, this procedure is a much cheaper al-
ternative to litigation.274 The level of proof for an alleged violation is low
because the NAD bases its judgment on its own reaction to the advertise-
ment.275 Although the NAD cannot force a firm to take corrective action, its
member firms will usually abide by the ruling, and the NAD can refer cases
to governmental agencies.276 The major television networks have their own
rules controlling advertisements they broadcast, 277 and consumers and com-
petitors can challenge commercials both before and after they air.278 These
alternative forms of redress often present a more attractive option than liti-
gation.
4. Practical Considerations Serve a Protective Function of Correct-
ing Misinformation Without Litigation
The realities of section 43(a) litigation have served a protective func-
tion on the market by correcting inaccuracies without litigation. 279 False
advertising damages are difficult to prove, and injunctive relief is the chief
remedy. 280 This remedial aspect of false advertising litigation has made such
lawsuits unattractive for contingency-fee cases.281 Therefore, legal fees re-
main high for plaintiffs, and plaintiffs typically choose less expensive alter-
natives to litigation.282 These realities form a natural barrier to an overflow
of false advertising litigation because without substantial rewards for bring-
ing a false advertising claim, parties turn to some of the other corrective
tools available. If parties could circumvent these natural barriers, section
273. Id. at 32-33; see also National Advertising Division, http://www.nadreview.org (last
visited Oct. 15, 2006).
274. See generally Lawrence I. Weinstein, False Advertising Claims: Consumer Class
Actions, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 10, 2005.
275. De Sevo, supra note 47, at 32.
276. Id. at 32-33.
277. Id. at 33.
278. Id.






43(a) litigation could reach undesirable levels and produce anticompetitive
conduct.
D. Adopting the Reasonable Interest Test and Proposal for Future Appli-
cation
Courts should adopt the reasonable interest test as articulated by the
Third Circuit in Conte Bros. and refined in Joint Stock. As of this writing,
only the Fifth Circuit has adopted the reasonable interest test.283 This article,
however, presents a slight modification to the test to balance the factors
when indirect competitor standing is desirable.
Under the directness of the injury prong, courts should consider wheth-
er the defendant's market has adopted levels of misinformation so as to
create an information-distressed market. Information-distressed markets
readily accept misinformation, and the participants in these markets build
their business models on misinformation. Examples of information-
distressed markets are quick weight-loss products, debt reduction services,
and home mortgages. The participants in these markets want to maintain the
current levels of misinformation in order to create monopolistic behavior
within the competitive market.284 Because the reasonable interest test as now
defined always favors direct competitors over indirect competitors, focusing
on whether direct competitors could bring the action will cause this factor to
disfavor standing for indirect competitors. To correct this problem, this fac-
tor should also consider the likelihood of direct competitors bringing correc-
tive action. If the market is distressed with misinformation that is fostered
by the direct participants, the prudential standing doctrine should afford
standing to indirect-competitors who will remedy the misinformation when
direct competitors will not.
The Conte Bros. and Joint Stock decisions also provide guidance on
procedural advice for courts to follow when faced with the issue of standing
in false advertising cases. There was no dispute in Conte Bros. that the
plaintiff met Article III standing requirements. In Joint Stock, the court de-
termined that the plaintiff lacked constitutional standing under Article III
but also provided a prudential standing analysis.2 85 This is the proper proce-
dure in the event of appeal. Because courts can address standing sua
283. See generally Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329
(5th Cir. 2002); Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, Inc., 263 F.3d 447 (5th Cir.
2001); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001).
284. Jeff Sovem, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1667-68 (2006) ("[E]ven competitive
markets may act monopolistically as to some features."); see also Bums, supra note 47, at
875 (noting a market injury may not negatively affect direct competitors).
285. Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 177-85 (3d Cir. 2001).
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sponte,286 courts should do so even if the defendant fails to challenge stand-
ing. Courts should also evaluate prudential standing in false advertising cas-
es even after determining Article III standing is lacking.
287
A Supreme Court precedent on section 43(a) standing is long overdue.
The Court seems poised to grant certiorari on this issue and adopt the rea-
sonable interest test. The addition of Justice Alito is an obvious indicator,
but other recent opinions show rationales of antitrust and intellectual proper-
ty law consistent with the reasonable interest test. In an opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the Court restricted the scope of the Robinson-Patman
Act2 88 to harmonize it with other antitrust laws by placing heightened re-
quirements for competitive injury. 289 Recently, Justice Stevens delivered an
opinion holding that patents do not automatically confer market power on
the patent holder,290 and Justice Thomas presented an opinion holding that
courts should not automatically grant permanent injunctions in patent in-
fringement cases, but instead, should apply the traditional four-factor test to
determine if such an injunction is appropriate.29' These decisions show the
Court would likely be receptive to the reasonable interest test as a procom-
petitive tool to serve the policy of section 43(a).
E. Effects of the Reasonable Interest Test
The most notable effect of a section 43(a) precedent is the application
of a uniform standard among the federal courts. Of course, a uniform stan-
dard does not mean uniform results. Plenty of differences exist among the
different circuits regarding interpretation of other provisions of the Lanham
Act.
292
286. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001).
287. Joint Stock Soc'y, 266 F.3d at 177-85; see also generally Am. Ass'n of Orthodont-
ists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no Article III standing
and holding that, under the facts of that case, prudential standing would fail under either test).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006). This section deals with price discrimination involving
competition between different purchasers for direct resale of the product. See id. If the prod-
ucts are of like quality, the seller cannot discriminate in price between the purchasers if the
discrimination would injure competition or create a monopoly. See id. The seller remains able
to charge different prices for variable expenses of manufacture, sale, or delivery. See id.
289. Volvo Trucks of N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 564 U.S. 164, 176-77
(2006)).
290. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006).
291. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
292. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 143 n. 150 (2005) (discussing the standards ap-
plied by various circuits for trademark infringement); see also Bruce P. Keller & David H.
Bernstein, The Right of Publicity: Towards a Federal Statute?, 532 PLI/PAT 413, 435 n.68
(1998) (noting different proof requirements for compensatory damages for Lanham Act
claims among the circuits). The American Intellectual Property Law Association provides a
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A less obvious effect of the reasonable interest test is that lower courts
are likely to increase the frequency of summary judgments granted to defen-
dants for lack of prudential standing. This phenomenon has already taken
place in patent law. 293 District courts may view granting summary judgment
as an effective tool because it would avoid the situation of having a trial just
to have the case reversed for lack of prudential standing. This is not neces-
sarily a bad result. Conte Bros. and Joint Stock were both cases in which
standing was clearly inappropriate. It would be beneficial to see appellate
opinions addressing cases in which the facts present a more balanced pru-
dential standing analysis.
As these effects take shape in the coming years, state laws will have a
growing impact on false advertising law. To this point, this article has ana-
lyzed the development of false advertising law through the federal system.
While false advertising was transitioning into its present form, states passed
deceptive trade practice laws that could have a profound effect on false ad-
vertising law. While these state laws have remained rather dormant, their
application has intensified in recent years, and this surge in state deceptive
trade practice law could upset the balance of false advertising and create
negative market effects.294
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF FALSE ADVERTISING LAW AND STATE
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES LAWS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also regulates false advertising.
The FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.' 295 Under this language, it is unlawful to "disseminate, or cause
to be disseminated, any false advertisement . . . [that] induc[es], or . . . is
likely to induce . . . the purchase of food, drugs, devices, services, or cos-
,,29629metics. Enforcement of this Act is entrusted to the FTC.297
Federal Circuit Map examining controlling standards on key trademark issues among the
different circuits. See Federal Circuit Map, available at http://www.aipla.org/
MSTemplate.cfn? Site=TrademarkLitigation1 (follow "Trademark Litigation Federal Cir-
cuit Map" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
293. Cheryl L. Johnson, Why Judges Are Destined to Flunk Their Markman Tests: The
History of Their Claim Construction Assignment, 873 PLU/PAT 9, 61 (2006); see also Paul M.
Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2006).
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. Jon Mize, Fencing off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the Role of Little
FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REv. 653, 656 (2005) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)).




FTC Act lawsuits are significantly different from Lanham Act
claims. 298 The most striking difference is what the FTC does not have to
prove: a false statement, intent to deceive, or injury. 299 The FTC Act stan-
dards are more lenient than section 43(a) because the FTC Act is shielded
from overenforcement by practical and political restraints. 30 0 For instance,
because FTC commissioners are appointed to limited terms,30 1 the commis-
sioner can be removed, and Congress can send signals through hearings,
legislation, and directives.30 2 Commissioners remain sensitive to political
pressures and developments, which serve as a controlling function to keep
their actions in check.30 3 Additionally, the FTC is provided with a relatively
small budget and staff.3°4 This limitation of resources compels the FTC to
focus its efforts on nontrivial deceptions.305 Moreover, the FTC Act limits
the scope of actions; the FTC can pursue only claims that "would be to the
interest of the public.
30 6
In response to these restraints and to its limited ability to bring claims,
the FTC produced rules that have made it easy for the FTC to prove that
actions are deceptive.30 7 Courts have generally been receptive to the FTC's
procedures for enhancing its ability to bring deceptive practices claims.30 8
Thus, the FTC Act developed through an arm of case law enforcement simi-
lar to the common law development of section 43(a). Because section 43(a)
enforcement had unlimited resources, the common law restricted the types
of claims that could be pursued. Conversely, with limited resources availa-
ble to the FTC, the case law broadened the scope of actions the FTC could
bring.309 The FTC Act served as a public enforcement prong, and the restric-
tions fostered the policy of procompetitive behavior because the FTC did
not have the resources to impose anticompetitive effects through overen-
forcement.31°
298. Id. at 657.
299. Id. at 657-58.
300. Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsider-
ing the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST, L.J. 437, 441-45 (1991) [hereinafter Private
Actions].
301. Id. at 441.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 442. The FTC's 2004 budget was $186 million. See Mize, supra note 295, at
666.
305. Private Actions, supra note 300, at 442.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 444.





A. Policy and Goals of Consumer Protection
The main problem with the FTC Act is that it does not establish a con-
crete definition of deceptive trade practice. 31 1 Another part of the problem is
the broad interpretation provided to the phrase "consumer protection." Con-
sumer protection seems to connote either eliminating all amounts of misin-
formation supplied to the market or equalizing bargaining power between
consumers and commercial parties.312 A pursuit of either of these goals will
ultimately yield anticompetitive results. Rather, consumer protection is best
defined as "a means to prevent consumers from misallocating resources due
to misinformation about a product's attributes., 313 This definition has re-
straints on what conduct will be considered deceptive. First, it is undesirable
to make actionable every amount of commercial information that may gen-
erate misallocations 314 because "[a]n attempt to eradicate all incorrect beliefs
would result in the cessation of communication. 3 5 Second, attempts to
equalize bargaining power will yield only short-term gains, if any, to the
consumer. 316 If the costs of consumer protection exceed the net benefits to
consumers, the net effect is anticompetitive, and consumers ultimately
shoulder the costs.
317
After a series of political maneuvers, the federal courts accepted a new
standard of deception set forth by the FTC.318 This new standard was called
the reasonable consumer test, and it essentially imposed a cost-benefit anal-
ysis. 319 Under this test, the FTC must show (1) that deception was probable
(not just possible) and (2) that the deception would occur to "consumers
acting reasonably in the circumstances., 320 As a third factor, the test applies
only to material deceptions that are likely to cause injury to a reasonably
relying consumer.321 The reasonable consumer test is the controlling federal
standard for deception.322 This standard has helped foster the policy of
granting redress only when doing so will ultimately benefit consumers as a
311. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
312. Thomas J. Holdych, Standards for Establishing Deceptive Conduct Under State
Deceptive Trade Practices Statutes That Impose Punitive Remedies, 73 OR. L. REV. 235,
246-48 (1994).
313. Id. at 246-47.
314. Id. at 247.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 248.
317. Id.
318. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under "Little FTC
Acts ": Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REv. 373, 386-87 (1990).






whole, not just the current consumer-plaintiff. As this standard of deception
developed in federal courts, states were generating their own standards for
deception and granting causes of action to consumers.
B. The States Adopt Little FTC Acts but Grant Public and Private En-
forcement
Nearly every state has passed a deceptive trade practices law based on
the FTC Act.323 These laws are often referred to as little FTC acts.324 States
adopted these acts during the "heyday of consumerism" in the 1960s and
1970s, 325 a period when sweeping consumer rights laws were in vogue.
326
The political climate of this era encouraged states to hastily pass these laws
without a thorough evaluation of their overall effect on the market.327
These acts share a problem with their federal counterpart: they do not
define what constitutes a deceptive trade practice.328 Little FTC acts grant
consumers private causes of action for deceptive trade practices. 329 Most of
the state laws provide a list of deceptive trade practices, but the list is non-
exhaustive and often includes a catch-all provision.330 Accordingly, little
FTC acts provide the "path of least resistance" for consumer plaintiffs and
could soon reach tort dujour status for bringing false advertising claims.331
These acts could also supplant traditional causes of action, like conversion
or breach of implied warranty of fitness 332 because rather than prove ele-
ments under these traditional causes of action, plaintiffs can bring suit under
323. Id. at 374-75; Private Actions, supra note 300, at 438-39; Mize, supra note 295, at
653.
324. Karns, supra note 318, at 374-75; Mize, supra note 295, at 653; Private Actions,
supra note 300, at 438-39.
325. J. R. Franke & D. A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judi-
cial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 347, 347 (1992); Victor E.
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Act, 54
U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 16 (2005).
326. For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was enacted on July 4, 1975 to
enhance consumer rights. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1107
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702.
327. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 325, at 347.
328. Karns, supra note 318, at 376-77; see also Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive
Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 658 (1985) (noting that everyone agrees deceptive trade
practices are bad, but a consensus has not been forged as to how to define it).
329. Mize, supra note 295, at 660.
330. See generally id.; Private Actions, supra note 300; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-88-107(b) (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
331. Mize, supra note 295, at 661.
332. See id. at 664-65.
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the little FTC act.333 Then, the plaintiff just has to show that the behavior
falls into one of the listed categories or the catch-all provision.334
The key difference between the FTC Act and little FTC acts is that en-
forcement of little FTC acts is free from the restraints imposed on the FTC
Act. States enacted little FTC acts based on the model of the public agency
as a vicarious avenger on behalf of consumers. 335 State agencies, like attor-
neys general, have power to bring deceptive trade practices actions, but in-
dividual consumers also have standing to bring these actions.336 Under little
FTC acts, these plaintiffs are free from the restraints that limit the FTC's
power, yet they still enjoy the benefit of a cause of action that requires sig-
nificantly less proof than its common law counterparts.337
Moreover, in their haste to protect consumers, little FTC acts often
provide additional awards in the form of treble damages, statutory damages,
punitive damages, and attorney's fees. 33 8 Almost half of the states require an
award of reasonable legal fees and costs to successful plaintiffs, providing
greater incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring little FTC act lawsuits.
339
Now an expansive body of statutory law exists that misapplies ill-fitted
and lenient FTC standards to general consumer standing without procedural
safeguards.34° When enacting little FTC acts, states have failed to appreciate
the overarching effects of granting consumers causes of action for a broad
range of conduct. 34' Absent from little FTC acts are the restraints that led to
the lenient standards upon which these laws are based. Attorneys general
and other state agencies are subject to political pressures and finite re-
sources, but they do not have the public interest requirement imposed on the
FTC. For example, an attorney general can choose not to bring an action on
behalf of all state consumers, but instead, choose to bring an action on be-
half of a state agency that could not prove a standard cause of action, such
as breach of implied warranty of fitness. Consumer standing presents an
even bigger problem because, considered in the aggregate, private plaintiffs
have no restraints. The plaintiff pool is literally every consumer and every
law firm in the state. They are subject to no political controls or public inter-
est concerns, and their resources are essentially infinite. Consumers can
bring any claim for any reason, no matter how insignificant the damages, if
the action can be construed as a deceptive trade practice.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. Private Actions, supra note 300, at 446.
336. Id. at 448.
337. Id. at 450; see also Mize, supra note 295, at 667.
338. Private Actions, supra note 300, at 448-49.
339. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 325, at 26.
340. See Private Action, supra note 300, at 446-50.
341. Schwartz and Silverman, supra note 325, at 5.
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Actions based primarily on little FTC acts have yet to be in vogue, but
it could be just beyond the horizon.34 2 Some states have tried to create addi-
tional elements for plaintiffs to establish,343 such as reliance344 or the fact
that the suit serves the public interest.345 However, state-law based false
advertising class actions have experienced a recent boom 346 as courts in New
York, Massachusetts, and California have set a low bar for standing in these
class actions.347 Additionally, the recently added removal procedures pro-
vided in the Class Action Fairness Act3 48 will transplant a number of these
cases into federal courts that normally would have remained in state
courts.
349
C. The Need for Judicial Deference to Limit the Scope of Little FTC Acts
The problem with little FTC acts is that, if enforced literally, they will
lead to gross anticompetitive behavior. The FTC was a small tool with li-
mited enforcement capabilities that posed no real danger to the market be-
cause the limited resources were incentives to focus cases on significant
market harms. Little FTC acts, on the other hand, give carte blanche power
to consumers to bring claims for any amount of misinformation. Consider a
basic trademark infringement case: Firm A sues Firm B for trademark in-
fringement. Under normal circumstances, this is the extent of the lawsuit. If
Firm A proves infringement, Firm B ceases its conduct and pays damages.
A little FTC act, applied literally, can wreck havoc on this lawsuit. The at-
torney general can bring a claim on behalf of state agencies that were con-
fused by the infringement. Note that the attorney general does not have to
act on behalf of consumers; he can decide not to bring such an action. Then
Mr. Smith, a consumer, can also bring a class action on behalf of all Arkan-
sas consumers who were confused by the infringement.35 ° With these plaus-
ible applications, the little FTC act has generated anticompetitive effects
greater than the trademark infringement originally at issue. These effects
result because the literal application of the little FTC act leads to opportunis-
342. Mize, supra note 295, at 668.
343. Id.
344. Id. (citing Baranco, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 456 S.E.2d 592, 593-94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995);
Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001)).
345. Id. (citing Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647
N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995)).
346. See generally Weinstein, supra note 274.
347. Id.
348. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
349. Id.
350. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 325, at 29 ("A business can face both a class
action lawsuit and a state Attorney General action arising out of the same conduct.").
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tic behavior by parties seeking monetary recovery when, ordinarily, they
would have no cause of action.
The anticompetitive effect of this opportunistic behavior also leads to
overenforcement of trademarks. If the above scenario became an acceptable
standard through courts' application of the little FTC act, the very threat of a
trademark lawsuit would cause the defendant to forego rights, whether or
not the initial trademark claim had merit. The newly created opportunistic
behavior would permit trademark owners to extend the reach of their trade-
mark rights beyond their intended scope.351
Another example is the popular advertisement "Snickers Really Satis-
fies." Obviously, not every consumer will be satisfied from eating a Snick-
ers bar. Under traditional legal rules, nothing happens aside from the unsa-
tisfied consumer not buying more Snickers bars. But, with a literal interpre-
tation of the little FTC act, that consumer can bring a class action with any
number of subclasses: (1) consumers who were not satisfied or (2) business-
es who put Snickers in their vending machines in anticipation of their cus-
tomers being satisfied, to name a few. If the little FTC act provides for at-
torney's fees and/or statutory damages, this provides further incentive for a
consumer to engage in opportunistic behavior.
While these examples may appear extreme, they comport with real cas-
es that have been brought under little FTC acts. In a New York case, a de-
partment store advertised dishes in the newspaper, but the newspaper mista-
kenly printed the wrong price.352 A consumer went to the department store
expecting the advertised price, but discovered the real price. 35 Under estab-
lished principles of contract law, the consumer would have no cause of ac-
tion because the misinformation supplied to the market was accidental, and
no contract had been formed at the incorrect price. However, given a literal
interpretation of the deceptive trade practices act, the department store en-
gaged in deceptive trade practices.354 The customer brought suit and was
actually awarded statutory damages under New York's little FTC act.355 In
another case, a Texas sheriff brought suit against a newspaper for publishing
a story linking the sheriff to drug trafficking.35 6 Bringing the suit under the
little FTC act, rather than libel law, allowed him to seek attorney's fees.357
Professor Sovern provides a number of examples of market misinfor-
mation that would become deceptive under a literal application of little FTC
351. See supra Part I.A.
352. See Private Actions, supra note 300, at 452 (citing Geismar v. Abraham & Strauss,
439 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1981)).
353. See id. (citing Geismar, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005).
354. See id. (citing Geismar, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005).
355. See id. (citing Geismar, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005).
356. Franke & Ballam, supra note 325, at 347-48.
357. Id. at 348.
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acts. If a business changes its location, its current yellow pages ad showing
the old address would be a violation. 8 If a singer gets sick and reschedules
a concert, that would be a violation.359 Political advertisements require sub-
jective interpretation of facts, and nearly every political advertisement could
be construed as a deceptive trade practice.36°
Turning to traditional rules of false advertising, puffery is nonactiona-
ble misinformation, but taken literally, puffery is a deceptive trade prac-
tice.36' Puffery consists of (1) exaggerated statements of bluster or boast
upon which no reasonable consumer would rely or (2) vague or highly sub-
jective claims of product superiority, including bald assertions of superiori-
ty.362 While a competitor cannot assert a cause of action for puffery under
section 43(a), consumers can likely bring a cause of action under a little
FTC act.
1. The Phenomenon of Attempted Overenforcement by Plaintiffs
The situations discussed above illustrate a recent phenomenon. During
the first twenty years of their passage, consumers only occasionally brought
claims under little FTC acts.363 While commentators warned against the
broad language of these laws, private enforcement had not reached abusive
levels.364 That trend is beginning to reverse, however, and consumers are
bringing actions that were never intended by these laws.365 For example,
California had the broadest consumer fraud statute in the country. 366 Con-
sumers filed a number of abusive lawsuits, including a claim against a res-
taurant for having a bathroom mirror that was an inch too high.367 California
recently amended its law to prevent these abusive practices.368 The trend in
California is the rule rather than the exception. At an alarming rate, plain-
tiffs are using little FTC acts to assert novel causes of action when no liabili-
ty should exist.
369
358. Private Actions, supra note 300, at 456.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390-91 (8th Cir.
2004) (denying a false advertising claim for the slogan "America's Favorite Pasta").
362. Id.
363. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 325, at 32.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 32-33.
366. Id. at 34.
367. Id. at 36-37.
368. Id. at 37.
369. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 325, at 37-38, 38-48 (discussing recent lawsuits
in which little FTC acts were applied beyond their intended use).
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Moreover, plaintiffs are using little FTC acts to circumvent other
laws. 370 For example, if the plaintiff cannot show defective design to estab-
lish a products liability case, the consumer can state the claim as a violation
of the little FTC act. 371 A recent Delaware case shows the extent of this
movement.3 72 The buyer ordered twenty industrial hoses from the seller.
3 73
The buyer was sophisticated and provided detailed specifications to the sel-
ler;374 the buyer even rejected suggested changes to the specifications rec-
ommended by the seller.375 The hoses met the specifications but did not
work properly,376 and the buyer brought suit for violation of Delaware's
little FTC act.377 But, the claim was dismissed on procedural grounds.378
2. Nominal Misinformation and Non-Misinformation
Analyzing the phenomenon of attempted overenforcement requires ex-
amination of the word "deceptive." The FTC Act and little FTC acts are in
agreement that the term "deceptive" should not be confined to a restrictive
definition. However, the essence of deception dictates some level of misin-
formation. For the defendant's conduct to be deceptive, the defendant must
supply misinformation. For example, if the defendant says the product will
yield certain results, but it does not; the defendant promises a certain price,
but charges a higher price-whatever the case, the defendant must supply
misinformation to the plaintiff.
The recent trend in attempted overenforcement can be categorized on
two levels. At the first level, plaintiffs are asserting causes of action for no-
minal misinformation. These are the situations, discussed by Professor So-
vern above, in which a party does supply misinformation to the market, but
the level of misinformation is too low to merit a lawsuit. In the trademark
infringement example, Firm B supplies nominal misinformation. Some con-
sumers purchase the Firm B product intending to get the Firm A product.
370. Id. at 63-64.
371. Id.at64.
372. See generally Don's Hydraulics, Inc. v. Colony Ins. Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 601 (D.
Del. 2006).
373. Id. at 605.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 605-06.
377. Id. at 606.
378. Don's Hydraulics, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 612. The Delaware little FTC act applies only
to the promotion of one's business; it does not apply to the relationship between a business
and its customer. See id. Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act applies to the relationship between
a business and its customer. See id. (discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511-26 (1999)).




The only "harm" to the plaintiff is the difference in quality between the two
products. These claims are unfavorable but at least understandable. Al-
though the plaintiffs are engaging in opportunistic behavior, they have a
right to do so until the law says they cannot.
At the second level, plaintiffs are asserting little FTC causes of action
in situations in which the defendant did not supply misinformation to the
market. Because deception should be viewed in terms of misinformation,
this article will refer to these situations as non-misinformation. In Don 's
Hydraulics, Inc. v. Colony Insurance Co. discussed above, the buyer had
complete control of the transaction and provided detailed specifications for
the goods.379 This is a classic example of non-misinformation: the seller
never had an opportunity to supply misinformation. These claims are unac-
ceptable because they represent an outright misapplication of little FTC acts.
No matter whether the claim is for nominal misinformation or non-
misinformation, both levels of claims lead to overenforcement, which nega-
tively affects consumers in general. The term "deceptive" should be more
narrowly defined to avoid this potential for overenforcement.
3. Changing Market Condition of Consumer Sophistication and
Sensitivity
Professor Chiappetta observed that trademark law must be constantly
re-evaluated against current market conditions to ensure that trademark law
still serves it procompetitive goals. 380 The same re-evaluation applies to little
FTC acts. The market realities regarding consumer sensitivity are much dif-
ferent than they were in the 1960s and 1970s when the little FTC acts were
passed. The internet has caused a significant change in the amount of infor-
mation available to consumers. With greater information access has come
greater sophistication, as consumers are able to better research firms and
their goods and services. More importantly, the internet provides a speech
forum for dissatisfied consumers to discuss their experience with other po-
tential consumers, so the dissatisfied consumer has much more power today
to induce corrective action than the consumer of the 1960s or 1970s.
Decades of advertising have further desensitized consumers so that
they are less susceptible to predatory practices. During the consumerism
heyday, national media advertising was still relatively new, and consumers
were more susceptible to claims and practices. Today's onslaught of irra-
tional advertising claims through span, television, and internet advertising
have caused consumers to be less susceptible to deceptive advertising. Little
379. Id. at 605-06.
380. Chiappetta, supra note 36, at 50. See also supra Part I.A.
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FTC acts need to be re-evaluated according to these changes in the market
conditions.
Because the little FTC acts have not been re-evaluated in light of
changing market conditions, the growing trend of little FTC act lawsuits is
even more alarming. When consumers were less informed and less sophisti-
cated, these lawsuits were filed infrequently. Now that consumers are less
vulnerable and more sophisticated, consumers are engaging in opportunistic
behavior by applying these laws beyond their intended scope. If courts sup-
port this opportunistic behavior through literal interpretations of little FTC
acts, it will cause destructive market effects. Even worse, consumers not
engaging in opportunistic behavior will ultimately bear the costs imposed by
consumers engaging in opportunistic behavior.
D. Consumers Ultimately Bear the Cost of Abusive Applications of Little
FTC Acts
Little FTC acts were drafted during the pro-consumer movement of the
twentieth century.381 Unfortunately, this pro-consumer philosophy focused
on the consumers involved in the transaction at issue, and equal considera-
tion was not given to the effect on all other consumers. When little FTC acts
are subject to overenforcement, an imbalance is created, adding costs im-
posed upon all other consumers that were not involved in the transaction,
because little FTC acts, like other business laws, determine when the costs
of a transaction will be imposed on businesses. Businesses will redistribute
these costs to consumers either directly, by increasing prices of goods and
services, or indirectly, by not making goods and services available. The
proper philosophical concern is the market in general, and all consumers in
general, rather than the consumers involved in the challenged transaction.
The concept of pro-consumer action should focus on all consumers because
taking a pro-consumer action with respect to only the immediate consumers
involved in the challenged transaction could be an anti-consumer action
with respect to all consumers.
Overenforcement of little FTC acts produces market inequalities, much
like misinformation supplied to the market. Creating causes of action for
every misinformation supplied will yield anticompetitive effects greater than
the inequality created by the misinformation.382 These anticompetitive ef-
fects could be devastating to local economies. Similarly, in jurisdictions
applying overenforcement of little FTC acts, consumers will experience
higher prices and less available goods and services. In jurisdictions applying
381. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 325, at 347; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note
325, at 16.
382. See supra Part I.B.
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excessive enforcement of little FTC acts, market participants will choose to
forego the local economy altogether. The proper approach is a level of en-
forcement that can secure optimal levels of accurate information and avoid
the anticompetitive effects of overenforcement.
E. Prudential Standing Considerations for Deceptive Trade Practices
Claims
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and the FTC Act serve the same poli-
cy goal of providing narrow causes of action to correct market misinforma-
tion under certain circumstances. Because little FTC acts were molded from
the FTC Act, they share a similar relationship with section 43(a) as does the
FTC Act. Just as prudential standing is the proper solution for molding the
scope of section 43(a), it is also the proper solution for little FTC acts.383
The Third Circuit briefly touched on this concept in Joint Stock.384 However,
the issue of general application of little FTC acts was not before the court,
and it did not provide guidance for state courts in crafting prudential stand-
ing measures for little FTC acts. States will have to develop prudential
standing measures for little FTC acts. The final section of this article will
make proposals for prudential standing under little FTC acts with a particu-
lar emphasis on Arkansas law. The principles and proposals discussed below
can have equal application to other jurisdictions.
V. INCORPORATING PRUDENTIAL STANDING AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
FOR THE ARKANSAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Up to this point, this article has addressed section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act and little FTC acts from a national perspective. The purpose now is to
shift focus to Arkansas law, with a number of goals in mind. This section
will provide Arkansas practitioners with a framework for handling Arkansas
false advertising cases. Also, this section will analyze the statutory scheme
and case law development of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(ADTPA).385 Finally, this article will present proposals for Arkansas courts
to incorporate prudential standing and for legislative action to amend the
ADTPA.
383. Messrs. Schwartz and Silverman touched on this concept by calling for "common-
sense construction" of little FTC acts. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 325, at 49-66.
384. Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 186 (3d Cir. 2001).
385. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101 to -607 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
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A. Arkansas Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
The Lanham Act does not preempt state trademark and unfair competi-
tion laws.3 86 Also, because the Lanham Act applies only to interstate com-
merce, trademark and unfair competition claims arising in intrastate com-
merce are governed by state law. Arkansas has its own statutory scheme for
trademarks and unfair competition. 387 Arkansas trademark law mirrors the
Lanham Act, and federal developments of the Lanham Act should have
equal application in Arkansas.388 A key difference, however, is that Arkan-
sas does not have a false advertising provision that mirrors section 43(a).389
Arkansas common law for unfair competition should provide a section
43(a)-style false advertising case, but research reveals no published deci-
sions in which such a cause of action was asserted. 390 A number of Eighth
Circuit cases that address false advertising under section 43(a) can provide
adequate guidance for state courts.39 1
The vernacular "false advertising" appears sporadically in Arkansas
39239cases and statutes. 3  The cases present false advertising as a fraud or
ADTPA type claim, rather than a section 43(a) type claim.394 The statutes
usually apply to a certain regulation of a particular industry 395 or the re-
quirements of a professional service's governing body.3 96 However, Arkan-
sas also has a broad criminal statute prohibiting false advertising,397 which
occurs when a false, "misleading," or "deceptive" statement is disseminated
386. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 22:2. A state law would be preempted, however, if the
state law sought to override rights provided by federal law. Id.
387. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-71-201 to -218 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
388. Gaston's White River Resort v. Rush, 701 F. Supp. 1431, 1435 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
389. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-71-201 to -218 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
390. Based upon Westlaw search sy,di("false advertising"). The available Arkansas cases
addressing "false advertising" involve consumers seeking redress. There are no cases of a
competitor bringing a false advertising claim against another competitor under Arkansas
common law for unfair competition.
391. See, e.g., Am. Ass'n of Orthodontics v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100,
1103-04 (8th Cir. 2006); Allsup, Inc. v. Advantage 2000 Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 1135,
1138 (8th Cir. 2005); EFCO Corp. v. Symons Corp., 219 F.3d 734, 739-40 (8th Cir. 2000);
United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
392. See Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 343 Ark. 627, 37 S.W.3d 590 (2001); Mega Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Jacola, 330 Ark. 261, 954 S.W.2d 898 (1997).
393. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-102-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (regulating acupunc-
turists); id. § 20-59-308 (LEXIS Repl. 2001) (regulating sales of milk); id. § 23-66-206(8)
(LEXIS Supp. 2005) (regulating insurance policies).
394. See Arkansas cases supra note 392.
395. See Arkansas statutes supra note 393.
396. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-29-311(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2005) (State Board of
Embalmers and Funeral Directors); id. § 17-42-31 l(a)(10) (LEXIS Supp. 2005) (Real Estate
Commission); id. § 17-90-305(a)(9) (LEXIS Repl. 2002) (State Board of Optometry).
397. Id. § 5-37-515 (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
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with the intent to sell goods or services.39 8 Violation of the statute is a mis-
demeanor, punishable by fines and imprisonment.399
Preliminary injunctive relief is commonplace with intellectual property
litigation and could be appropriate for a state false advertising claim. The
Arkansas standard for preliminary injunctive relief differs from most juris-
dictions400 in that Arkansas does not distinguish a temporary restraining
order from a preliminary injunction.40 The only factors considered in Ar-
kansas are the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable
harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is not issued.40 2 Potential
harm to the defendant and public interests are not considerations,4 3 unlike
the federal standards.404 As a result, the initial motion and hearing for pre-
liminary injunctive relief can move faster in Arkansas state courts than in
federal courts. Despite these differences from the federal standards, obtain-
ing preliminary injunctive relief should not be considered "easy., 40 5 Even
when successful, the moving party must post an appropriate bond and incur
the additional attorney's fees involved with obtaining preliminary injunctive
relief.
406
B. Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
In 1971, Arkansas enacted its own little FTC act, the Arkansas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA).4 °7 Like other little FTC acts, the ADTPA
does not define deception,40 8 although it does specifically prohibit pyramid
schemes. 40 9 There are four substantive sections that merit close attention.
First, the main section sets out eleven general descriptions of violations that
398. Id. § 5-37-515(b).
399. Id. § 5-37-515(d). Thankfully, this statute has never actually been applied to impri-
son anyone. The author has serious concerns with this statute, but that is a discussion for
another day.
400. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 65.
401. See id.
402. See id.; see also Baptist Health v. Murphy, No. 04-430, 2006 WL 242670, at *2
(Ark. Feb. 2, 2006).
403. ARK. R. Civ. P. 65.
404. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
405. See generally, e.g., AJ & K Operating Co., Inc. v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d.
475 (2004) (reversing temporary restraining order on appeal); Three Sisters Petroleum, Inc. v.
Langley, 348 Ark. 167, 72 S.W.3d 95 (2002) (reversing temporary restraining order on ap-
peal); Johnson v. Langley, No. CA 05-354, 2005 WL 3196776 (Ark. App. Nov. 30, 2005)
(denying temporary restraining order); City Slickers, Inc. v. Douglas, 73 Ark. App. 64, 40
S.W.3d 805 (2001) (denying temporary restraining order).
406. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
407. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101 to -607 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
408. See id. § 4-88-102 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
409. Id. § 4-88-109 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
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would be considered an unconscionable or deceptive trade practice.410 This
section also includes a catch-all provision for any other conduct falling out-
side the general descriptions.4 1 Second, the advertising section deems de-
ception made in the course of advertising a violation.41 2 Given the breadth of
the main section, it is unclear what additional conduct the advertising sec-
tion adds that is not subsumed in the main section. 3 Third, the civil en-
forcement section provides for injunctive relief,414 actual damages, 415 and
attorney's fees; 4 16 however, the ADTPA does not provide treble damages or
statutory damages. 417 Fourth, the ADTPA provides a five-year statute of
limitations for all violations, running from the date of the violation or the
date the cause of action accrued.41 8
A cursory review of these sections shows the problems with enacting
such broad, sweeping legislation. The main section is written so broadly that
a literal interpretation would encompass any degree of misinformation sup-
plied to the market. The remedy sections allow for attorneys fees and extend
the limitations period to five years. Plaintiffs can attempt to circumvent tra-
ditional claims like negligence, malpractice, or breach of an implied warran-
ty by re-pleading these established causes of action as a breach of the
ADTPA. If successful, this circumvention will provide a greater limitations
period and more extensive remedies (attorney's fees) to which these plain-
tiffs were not previously entitled.
1. Development of the ADTPA Through Arkansas State Courts
The ADTPA remained dormant until a recent surge in ADTPA litiga-
tion.419 The available decisions illustrate some important points in the devel-
opment of the ADTPA. First, only a few decisions provide substantive anal-
ysis. Second, earlier decisions established that attorney's fees are not availa-
ble when only injunctive relief is sought,420 and the catch-all provision is not
410. Id. § 4-88-107(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
411. Id. § 4-88-107(b).
412. Id. § 4-88-108 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
413. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (LEXIS Supp. 2005), with id. § 4-88-108.
414. Id. § 4-88-113(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
415. Id. § 4-88-113(a)(2).
416. Id. §4-88-113(f).
417. Id.
418. Id. § 4-88-115 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
419. The basis for this assertion is a Westlaw search for "deceptive trade" in Arkansas
state cases conducted on August 18, 2006. This search revealed thirty-three cases, the earliest
appearing in 1991. Most available decisions were handed down in 1999 or later.
420. State ex rel. Bryant v. McLeod, 318 Ark. 781, 786-87, 888 S.W.2d 639, 642 (1994).
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too vague for enforcement.42' Third, in the only case to determine what con-
duct is not a violation, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that a subsidiary
corporation's use of the parent corporation's name and logo was not, by
itself, an ADTPA violation,422 and the court affirmed summary judgment
denying the ADTPA claim. 423 Finally, Judge Phillips, in an unpublished
opinion denying class certification, noted that under the ADTPA, the defen-
dant must "knowingly" commit a deceptive trade practice in order to be
liable.
424
Often the published decision is a procedural matter without a substan-
tive ADTPA analysis,425 even when the court is affirming a summary judg-
ment denying the ADTPA claim. 426 However, three recent cases provide
substantive rules. First, the plaintiffs subjective belief of the defendant's
deceptive conduct cannot, by itself, establish an issue of fact to avoid sum-
mary judgment. 427 Second, regarding the requisite injury for an ADTPA
claim, the plaintiff must establish an ascertainable lOSS. 4 2 8 Finally, the
ADTPA cannot be used to circumvent established law governing products
liability and implied warranties.42 9
421. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 336 Ark. 289, 295, 985 S.W.2d 299, 302
(1999).
422. Little Rock Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Entergy Corp., 79 Ark. App. 337, 343, 87
S.W.3d 842, 846 (2002).
423. Id.
424. Frelin v. Oakwood Homes Corp., No. CIV-2001-53-3, 2002 WL 31863487, at *5
(Ark. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2002).
425. See generally Alltel Corp. v. Sumner, 360 Ark. 573, 203 S.W.3d 77 (2005) (denying
motion to compel arbitration).
426. See generally Ver Weire v. CNA Fin. Corp., No. CA 04-1355, 2005 WL 2293475
(Ark. App. Sept. 21, 2005); Little Rock Elec. Contractors, Inc., 79 Ark. App. at 342, 87
S.W.3d at 845-46.
427. Little Rock Elec. Contractors, Inc., 79 Ark. App. at 342-43, 87 S.W.3d at 845-46
(affirming summary judgment).
428. Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 327-28, 208 S.W.3d 153, 161 (2005). The
plaintiff brought a consumer class action under the ADTPA claiming a design defect in the
Ford Explorer, but the plaintiff could not show any actual injury. Id. at 318, 208 S.W.3d at
154. The damage claim was limited to a theory of diminished economic value. Id., 208
S.W.3d at 154-55.
429. See generally Pilcher v. Suttle Equip. Co., No. 05-143, 2006 WL 137220 (Ark. Jan.
18, 2006) (affirming summary judgment when the buyer purchased logging machinery that
caught fire three years after purchase).
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2. Arkansas Federal Courts Provide Additional Guidance
Federal cases involving the ADTPA have also experienced a recent
spike.43° While the decisions rarely yield a substantive ADTPA analysis,
two decisions provide guidance on application of the ADTPA. In one case,
Judge Van Sickle of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas upheld the ADTPA as an affirmative defense.43' A limited part-
nership sold partnership interests to certain limited partners.432 The partners
purchased the interests by providing notes payable to the partnership.433 Af-
ter filing for bankruptcy, the partnership sued for the balances on the notes,
but the partners raised fraud and the ADTPA as affirmative defenses.434 The
court found that the partnership had made misrepresentations that violated
the ADTPA, and those violations would serve as a complete defense to the
action on the notes.435
In Mid-State Aftermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. MQVP, Inc.,436 Judge
Holmes issued an important opinion regarding the ADTPA. MQVP, Inc.
stated twin causes of action for false advertising under section 43(a) and
violation of the ADTPA.437 Determining the false advertising claim was
untenable, the court granted summary judgment to Mid-State Aftermar-
ket.438 The court refused to permit circumvention of section 43(a) and held
that the claim for violation of the ADTPA was dependent upon showing a
section 43(a) violation.439 The court also granted summary judgment to Mid-
State Aftermarket on the ADTPA claim. 440 This was effectively the same
approach as Justice Alito's reasoning in applying section 43(a) prudential
standing to state deceptive trade practices law. 44 Although this case was
recently reversed because the Eighth Circuit determined an issue of fact
430. A search was performed in Westlaw, "deceptive trade" /10 Arkansas, in all federal
courts in the Eighth Circuit, performed on August 18, 2006. The results produced twenty-six
cases, the earliest in 1989.
431. New Equity Sec. Holders Comm. for Golden Gulf, Ltd. v. Phillips, 97 B.R. 492,502
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989).
432. Id. at 494.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 495.
435. Id. at 502.
436. 361 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
437. Id. at 901.
438. Id. at 904.
439. Id. at911.
440. Id.




exists as to the false advertising claim, the Eighth Circuit did not address the
ADTPA claim." 2
3. Analyzing the Trends in ADTPA Litigation
This brief survey of the ADTPA shows four significant trends in Ar-
kansas law. First, plaintiffs are trying to use the ADTPA to circumvent es-
tablished causes of action, like products liability and section 43(a) viola-
tions. Without corrective action, this pattern will continue to grow and ulti-
mately yield anticompetitive effects. Second, Arkansas courts have refused
to permit circumvention of established laws through the ADTPA. The ana-
lyses of these decisions are not overly thorough, but it appears that Arkansas
courts are applying some level of prudential standing considerations to
ADTPA claims. Third, the appellate courts have had few opportunities to
substantively evaluate ADTPA claims. The case law above provides rela-
tively little guidance to trial courts, defendants, and plaintiffs. Fourth, it is
reasonable to conclude that Arkansas trial courts are experiencing a surge in
ADTPA claims. This increase is apparent in the appellate courts and reflects
the nationwide trend.
The legislature has been relatively inactive regarding the ADTPA.
There have been no efforts to codify defenses or to clarify the main section.
The legislature's inactivity is largely a result of ADTPA cases not being
pursued through appeal. Without substantive rulings from the appellate
courts, the legislature has no guidance for needed statutory revisions. Meas-
ures need to be taken to address the growing trend in ADTPA litigation and
legislative inactivity. This article suggests that both goals can be accom-
plished through application of prudential standing in ADTPA cases.
C. Proposal for Adopting Prudential Standing Considerations in ADTPA
Cases
Prudential standing will serve as an effective tool to achieve optimal
levels of accurate information and to prevent the anticompetitive effects of
overenforcement of the ADTPA. Arkansas federal courts have already
touched on the Lanham Act policy presented in this article to promote op-
timal levels of accurate information. 43 Arkansas has the opportunity to
442. See generally Mid-State Aftermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. MQVP, Inc., 466 F.3d 630
(8th Cir. 2006). An issue of fact also existed on the trademark infringement claim, and the
Eighth Circuit criticized the district court's application of the term "service mark." Id. at 633.
443. Mid-State Aftermarket Body Parts, Inc. v. MQUP, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900-
01 (E.D. Ark. 2005), rev'd, 466 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaston's White River Resort
v. Rush, 701 F. Supp. 1431, 1434 (W.D. Ark. 1988)) ("The purpose of the Lanham Act is to
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emerge as a leading jurisdiction in solving the dilemma of overenforcement
of little FTC acts by completing two simple tasks.
The first task is to establish the general elements of ADTPA claims.
The appellate courts have not listed out elements for trial courts to consider,
and parties to ADTPA litigation are left without guidance. An ADTPA
claim should consist of four basic elements: (1) the defendant wrongfully
supplied misinformation to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff reasonably relied
on the misinformation; (3) the plaintiff suffered an actual injury; and (4) the
injury is of the type intended to be remedied by the ADTPA.
The second task is to adopt prudential standing requirements for
ADTPA claims. This article proposes the following prudential standing fac-
tors: (1) nature of the injury; (2) culpability of the defendant; (3) reasonable
reliance by the plaintiff; (4) effects on Arkansas consumers; and (5) practic-
al considerations of the desired remedy. Each factor will be addressed in
turn.
1. Nature of the Injury
This factor examines the type of harm the plaintiff has suffered because
of the misinformation. The analysis should answer the following question:
Did the misinformation at issue cause the type of harm meant to be reme-
died through the ADTPA? The Arkansas Supreme Court has already stated
that a consumer must show an actual injury, rather than a theory of dimi-
nished economic value of property.444 Consequently, the ADTPA already
has an injury-in-fact requirement, which is missing from the little FTC acts
of many other states.
Once an injury-in-fact is established, courts should evaluate the misin-
formation giving rise to the claim. First, the court should consider whether
the claim asserts nominal misinformation.445 Second, the court should con-
sider whether the claim asserts non-misinformation to circumvent traditional
causes of action." 6 If the claim asserts nominal misinformation or non-
misinformation, the injury is not one meant to be remedied through the
ADTPA.
protect consumers and competitors against misdescription or misrepresentation of products
and services.").
444. Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 327-29, 208 S.W.3d 153, 161-62 (2005).
445. See examples of nominal misinformation supra Part IV.C.2.
446. Recent Arkansas cases have demonstrated claims for non-misinformation to circum-
vent traditional causes of action for products liability and false advertising. See generally
Pilcher v. Suttle Equip. Co., No. 05-143, 2006 WL 137220 (Ark. Jan. 18, 2006); Mid-State
Aftermarket, 466 F.3d 630.
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2. Culpability of the Defendant
Although the ADTPA does not require proof of the defendant's intent,
several of the established factors incorporate a "knowingly" standard. Thus,
this factor should focus on the defendant's culpability but not require an all-
out element of proof to maintain an ADTPA claim. The essential question
should be the following: Is it equitable for this defendant to be liable for the
misinformation at issue? Courts should not consider the plaintiffs subjec-
tive statements about the defendant's intent but should consider circumstan-
tial evidence surrounding the transaction at issue. Because the purpose of
this factor is to avoid the anticompetitive effects of providing ADTPA
claims for misinformation inadvertently supplied to the market, no defen-
dant should incur ADTPA liability without some degree of mental culpabili-
ty to supply misinformation to the market.
3. Reasonable Reliance by the Plaintiff
Because consumers are better informed and more sophisticated than
their consumerism heyday counterparts, reasonable limits should apply to
the scope of consumer reliance. This factor requires the plaintiff to behave
like a reasonable consumer in that the plaintiff must actually rely on the
misinformation when making the purchasing decision, and this reliance
must be reasonable. This factor prevents ADTPA claims for puffery and
situations in which the consumer's choice was based upon representations of
a party other than the defendant. This factor should also consider the sophis-
tication of the buyer for the particular goods or services at issue. For exam-
ple, although a typical consumer may have standing against the manufactur-
er of a quick weight loss product, a medical professional should not.
4. Effects of the Present Action on Other Arkansas Consumers
This factor analyzes the claim outside the vacuum of the instant dispute
and is synonymous with the third and fifth factors of the reasonable interest
test for section 43(a) standing.447 Here, the court should address the overall
market effect of allowing the current plaintiff to bring an ADTPA claim. A
successful ADTPA claim for the present consumer will impose costs on all
Arkansas consumers; therefore, standing is desirable only when these costs
are less than the market inequalities generated from the misinformation at
issue. The more individualized the transaction at issue, the more likely
standing will be appropriate.
447. See supra Part I.D.
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Courts should closely scrutinize ADTPA claims asserted for standard
business dealings applied to all consumers. These claims present maximum
profit potential for the plaintiff, particularly through class action litigation,
which increases the likelihood that the plaintiff is engaging in opportunistic
behavior. Conversely, these claims are desirable in information-distressed
markets in which market participants are not correcting the misinformation.
Application of this factor turns on the anticompetitive effects by declar-
ing the misinformation at issue a deceptive trade practice. If permitting the
ADTPA claim would lead to anticompetitive effects, this factor should
weigh against standing. The significant anticompetitive effects to consider
are increased costs to nonparticipating consumers and the effects on extra-
territorial investment in Arkansas. If Arkansas becomes a haven for exces-
sive ADTPA enforcement, it will cause a reduction in economic investment
in Arkansas from outside sources.
5. Practical Considerations of the Desired Remedy
This factor focuses on the remedy sought. The purpose of the ADTPA
is to achieve optimal levels of accurate information in the market, and the
remedy sought must serve that purpose. The chief remedy will be injunctive
relief to prevent further dissemination of the misinformation, and in addition
to injunctive relief, the plaintiff will request her actual damages. The remedy
must be tailored to correct the misinformation without encouraging ineffi-
cient profit-seeking by the current plaintiff and potential future plaintiffs.
Situations can arise in which the misinformation should be corrected,
but any remedy would be impractical. Suppose an Arkansas consumer
brings a claim against a nationwide retailer doing business in Arkansas. The
challenged conduct consists of statements appearing in the retailer's nation-
wide advertising campaign regarding certain products. The statements ap-
pear on the retailer's website and all media advertisements. Even if the
statements were deemed an ADTPA violation, any remedy would be im-
practical. An injunction could apply only to advertisements sent directly to
Arkansas in local media. The Arkansas injunction could not shut down the
website to prevent dissemination into Arkansas by national media. If dam-
ages were awarded, it would create a revolving door for all other Arkansas
consumers to bring an ADTPA claim. Enforcing the remedy would generate
anticompetitive effects. The retailer would distribute its costs to Arkansas
consumers and decrease investment in Arkansas. More importantly, other
nationwide businesses would respond in kind given the threat of extensive
liability exposure in Arkansas. Therefore, if a practical remedy is unavaila-
ble, this factor should weigh against standing.
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D. Effects of Prudential Standing
The prudential standing model proposed in this article will promote the
interest of having optimal levels of accurate information in the market. Me-
ritorious ADTPA claims will meet the standing requirements and correct
market inequalities created through misinformation. Prudential standing will
serve as a tool against overenforcement, particularly against claims for no-
minal misinformation or non-misinformation. Even more importantly, adop-
tion of prudential standing considerations will produce more substantive
analyses from the appellate courts. In cases in which the appellate courts are
primarily addressing procedural matters, the courts can evaluate prudential
standing. The trial courts, legislature, and practitioners are starved for subs-
tantive ADTPA precedents, and evaluating prudential standing will generate
this needed substantive precedent and provide better guidance for ADTPA
development in the circuit courts.
Additionally, prudential standing will yield procompetitive effects by
limiting ADTPA claims to those that serve to achieve optimal levels of ac-
curate information in the market. Even when consumers are denied ADTPA
standing, they are not denied all forms of redress because they can still bring
traditional causes of action, such as fraud, breach of contract, or unjust
enrichment. By and large, ADTPA claims are brought as companion claims
for these types of actions; rarely is the ADTPA the singular cause of action
asserted. Prudential standing limits only the types of actions that can be
brought under the ADTPA.
E. Proposal for Legislative Measures
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a non-partisan
membership organization of state legislators, 448 recently prepared the Model
Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes ("Model
Act").449 The Model Act is designed as a comprehensive overhaul of various
little FTC acts, and some of the suggested provisions are relevant to Arkan-
sas.
This article proposes that the Arkansas legislature should adopt three
provisions from the Model Act. First, the Model Act provides a notice pro-
vision:
At least ten days prior to the commencement of any action brought under
this section, any person intending to bring such an action shall notify the
448. See American Legislative Exchange Council, available at http://www.alec.org (last
visited Aug. 19, 2006).




prospective defendant of the intended action, and give the prospective
defendant an opportunity to confer with the person, the person's counsel,
or other representative as to the proposed action. Such notice shall be
given to the prospective defendant by mail, postage prepaid, to the pros-
pective defendant's usual place of business, or if the prospective defen-
dant has no usual place of business, to the prospective defendant's last
known address.450
This notice provision creates an opportunity for corrective action without
litigation. A similar notice provision is found in the consumer-protective
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,451 and has been adopted in other states' little
FTC acts.452 Second, the Model Act proposes limited awards of attorney's
fees. The attorney's fees provision should be a "may" provision, rather than
a "shall" provision.453 The plaintiff should receive attorney's fees only when
the defendant's conduct is found to be willful, with the purpose of deceiving
the public. 454 Additionally, the prevailing defendant should receive attor-
ney's fees if the action was groundless, brought in bad faith, or brought for
the purpose of harassment.455 The attorney's fees provision mirrors the Lan-
ham Act, which provides that attorney's fees may be awarded in exceptional
cases. 456 The Lanham Act does not define exceptional cases, but courts gen-
erally award attorney's fees when the trademark infringement is malicious,
fraudulent, deliberate, or willful, or when the litigation is conducted in a
vexatious manner.45 7 Successful defendants may also win attorney's fees for
bad faith claims, but these awards are rare.458 Making attorney's fees discre-
tionary, rather than mandatory, reduces opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs.
Finally, the Model Act suggests a one-year limitations period. 459 This seems
too harsh, but the current Arkansas five-year limitations period is too long.
450. See Model Act § l(b).
451. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006).
452. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon 2002). For a thorough
discussion of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, see RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, THE
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (LEXIS Law Pub. 2d ed.
2003).
453. See Model Act § 2.
454. See id. § 2(a).
455. See id. § 2(b).
456. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
457. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2000); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2000); Blue
Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir. 1999);
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
generally Christopher P. Bussert, Interpreting the "Exceptional Cases " Provision of Section
l117(a) of the Lanham Act: When an Award of Attorney's Fees Is Appropriate, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 1118 (2002).
458. MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 30:101.
459. See Model Act § 3.
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It should be changed to three years, which is the customary limitations pe-
riod for statutory rights.46°
In addition to these amendments, the legislature should become respon-
sive to judicial developments in prudential standing. Federal unfair competi-
tion law develops through case law interpretation with periodic Lanham Act
amendments to codify or abrogate case law doctrine. Arkansas should use
the same procedure with the ADTPA. As more published opinions are pro-
duced with prudential standing analyses, the legislature should create de-
fenses and other statutory revisions to adopt and/or modify case law devel-
opment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Information drives the market economy, and decisions regarding in-
formation regulation will remain on the forefront of legal issues in the years
to come. False advertising and deceptive trade practices laws are two com-
ponents of information law that, when applied properly, can promote optim-
al levels of accurate information in the marketplace. Conversely, overen-
forcement will produce market inequalities greater than the original misin-
formation at issue. The reasonable interest test for prudential standing, as
modified, fosters the procompetitive effect of securing accurate information
without the anticompetitive effects of overenforcement. Arkansas can ac-
complish the same results by incorporating prudential standing considera-
tions into ADTPA claims, which can provide a model for other jurisdictions
to follow. With these standards, courts can effectively adjudicate cases in-
volving misinformation supplied to the market.
460. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2005); see also McDonald v.
Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 230, 183 S.W. 751, 752 (1916); Zimmerman v. W & S Fire Ins. Co.,
121 Ark. 408, 410-11, 181 S.W. 283, 284 (1915); Neb. Nat'l Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59
S.W. 952 (1900).
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